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### Advantage 1- Islanding

#### Small nuclear reactors key to prevent bases from being vulnerable to inevitable grid outages- the impact is nuclear war

Andres and Breetz 11

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Grid Vulnerability. DOD is unable to provide its ¶ bases with electricity when the civilian electrical grid is ¶ offline for an extended period of time. Currently, domestic military installations receive 99 percent of their ¶ electricity from the civilian power grid. As explained in a ¶ recent study from the Defense Science Board:¶ DOD’s key problem with electricity is that critical ¶ missions, such as national strategic awareness and ¶ national command authorities, are almost entirely ¶ dependent on the national transmission grid . . . ¶ [which] is fragile, vulnerable, near its capacity ¶ limit, and outside of DOD control. In most cases, ¶ neither the grid nor on-base backup power provides¶ sufficient reliability to ensure continuity of critical ¶ national priority functions and oversight of ¶ strategic missions in the face of a long term (several ¶ months) outage.¶ 7¶ The grid’s fragility was demonstrated during the 2003 ¶ Northeast blackout in which 50 million people in the ¶ United States and Canada lost power, some for up to a ¶ week, when one Ohio utility failed to properly trim trees. ¶ The blackout created cascading disruptions in sewage ¶ systems, gas station pumping, cellular communications, ¶ border check systems, and so forth, and demonstrated the ¶ interdependence of modern infrastructural systems.¶ 8¶ More recently, awareness has been growing that ¶ the grid is also vulnerable to purposive attacks. A report sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security suggests that a coordinated cyberattack on the grid ¶ could result in a third of the country losing power for ¶ a period of weeks or months.¶ 9¶ Cyberattacks on critical ¶ infrastructure are not well understood. It is not clear, for ¶ instance, whether existing terrorist groups might be able ¶ to develop the capability to conduct this type of attack. It ¶ is likely, however, that some nation-states either have or ¶ are working on developing the ability to take down the ¶ U.S. grid. In the event of a war with one of these states, ¶ it is possible, if not likely, that parts of the civilian grid ¶ would cease to function, taking with them military bases ¶ located in affected regions.¶ Government and private organizations are currently ¶ working to secure the grid against attacks; however, it is ¶ not clear that they will be successful. Most military bases ¶ currently have backup power that allows them to function for a period of hours or, at most, a few days on their ¶ own. If power were not restored after this amount of time, ¶ the results could be disastrous. First, military assets taken ¶ offline by the crisis would not be available to help with disaster relief. Second, during an extended blackout, global ¶ military operations could be seriously compromised; this ¶ disruption would be particularly serious if the blackout ¶ was induced during major combat operations. During the ¶ Cold War, this type of event was far less likely because the United States and Soviet Union shared the common understanding that blinding an opponent with a grid blackout could escalate to nuclear war. America’s current opponents, however, may not share this fear or be deterred ¶ by this possibility.¶ In 2008, the Defense Science Board stressed that ¶ DOD should mitigate the electrical grid’s vulnerabilities by turning military installations into “islands” of ¶ energy self-sufficiency.¶ 10¶ The department has made efforts to do so by promoting efficiency programs that ¶ lower power consumption on bases and by constructing ¶ renewable power generation facilities on selected bases. ¶ Unfortunately, these programs will not come close to ¶ reaching the goal of islanding the vast majority of bases. ¶ Even with massive investment in efficiency and renewables, most bases would not be able to function for more ¶ than a few days after the civilian grid went offline. Unlike other alternative sources of energy, small reactors have the potential to solve DOD’s vulnerability to ¶ grid outages. Most bases have relatively light power demands when compared to civilian towns or cities. Small ¶ reactors could easily support bases’ power demands separate from the civilian grid during crises. In some cases, ¶ the reactors could be designed to produce enough power ¶ not only to supply the base, but also to provide critical ¶ services in surrounding towns during long-term outages.¶ Strategically, islanding bases with small reactors ¶ has another benefit. One of the main reasons an enemy ¶ might be willing to risk reprisals by taking down the ¶ U.S. grid during a period of military hostilities would ¶ be to affect ongoing military operations. Without the ¶ lifeline of intelligence, communication, and logistics ¶ provided by U.S. domestic bases, American military operations would be compromised in almost any conceivable contingency. Making bases more resilient to ¶ civilian power outages would reduce the incentive for ¶ an opponent to attack the grid. An opponent might ¶ still attempt to take down the grid for the sake of disrupting civilian systems, but the powerful incentive to ¶ do so in order to win an ongoing battle or war would ¶ be greatly reduced.

#### Grids goes down- laundry list of reasons

Slavo 7/12

(Mac is editor of shftplan, “UPDATE: Cascading Grid Crash: Now 600 Million Without Power in India (Are We Vulnerable?)” <http://www.shtfplan.com/headline-news/paralysis-grid-down-in-india-370-million-left-without-power_07302012>, SEH)

The power grid in the United States, while more advanced and apparently better maintained, is also under excessive strain as has been witnessed in recent years with rolling brownouts, blackouts, and unforeseen crashes resulting from key component failure.¶ One industry insider who has worked in the utility industry for nearly two decades advised this author recently that it wouldn’t take much to bring down the system even in the United States, potentially affecting tens of millions of customers. Though it’s the 21st century, many grid components in operation are, in some cases, as much as 40 years old, thus replacement parts are almost impossible to find. Other components, like massive transformers may take weeks or months to replace. In the event of a scenario where multiple components are targeted simultaneously, by either a man-made EMP or natural event, it is not too far of a stretch to suggest that the afflicted regions would be engulfed in pandemonium.¶ This potential for widespread failure is so plausible that former Congressman Roscoe Bartlett, who has spoken on the vulnerabilities of the US power grid, has advised that Those Who Can, Should Move Their Families Out Of the City:¶ After Hurricane Ike passed through the Houston area 2008 some 90% of the metropolitan was without power. While hospitals, police and critical infrastructure was restored within a few days, residents in outlying suburban areas experienced the outage for over three weeks. We witnessed the rapid loss of patience, increased anxiety and frustration, and the subsequent breakdown of interpersonal interaction at high-demand venues such as gas stations, where long lines, screaming matches and even fist fights became a common occurrence.¶ The bottom line: As demonstrated in India today, Quebec in 1989 (caused by a geo-magnetic storm originating from the sun), Ike in 2008, Hurricane Irene on the East coast in 2012 and the plethora of incidents that have taken place over the last couple of decades, the North American power grid, just as India’s, is susceptible to far-from-equilibrium situations, and sometimes it takes extended periods of time to get power up and running.¶ With just three major grids running the United States, our dependence on massive flows of electricity to power our home air conditioners, food refrigeration, communications, water and gas pump systems, and daily business operations could come to a screeching halt should the grid ever be struck by a natural disaster like a solar coronal mass ejection or a large-scale earthquake in California or on the Madrid fault. Likewise, as we’ve noted previously, rogue organizations looking to wreak havoc have already demonstrated the staggering security holes in our power, water and oil grid infrastructure, with leading cyber security firms noting that it is just a matter of time before disaster strikes.¶ While a short-term, isolated metropolitan outage can be dealt with by sourcing labor and supplies from unaffected areas of the country, considering that the US operates on three key power grid systems, a region-wide outage affecting just one of these nodes could lead to a cascading breakdown in the electrical power system that envelops the entire country.¶ The most dangerous possibility emerges when we look at threats posed by the sun or a rogue terror cell or nation that could deploy an Electro-Magnetic Pulse weapon (EMP / Super EMP) over American skies. It’s been surmised that either one of these possibilities could cause damage so staggering that the grid would be down for months, leaving millions without just-in-time food and gas delivery systems, medical care, local emergency response, or even clean water. According to one estimate, some 90% of Americans would die in such a scenario if the power wasn’t restored within one year.¶ Thus, it is clear that our power grids are a critical lifeline to keeping life as we know it in the world today operational. And, as we have seen historically and India this morning, power grids can and do crash – even in countries with hundreds of millions of residents.

#### Cyber-attack is coming ---actors are probing grid weaknesses

**Reed 10/11** John, Reports on the frontiers of cyber war and the latest in military technology for Killer Apps at Foreign Policy, "U.S. energy companies victims of potentially destructive cyber intrusions", 2012, killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/11/us\_energy\_companies\_victims\_of\_potentially\_destructive\_cyber\_attacks

Foreign actors are probing the networks of key American companies in an attempt to gain control of industrial facilities and transportation systems, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta revealed tonight.¶ "We know that foreign **cyber actors are probing America's critical infrastructure networks**," said Panetta, disclosing previously classified information during a speech in New York laying out the Pentagon's role in protecting the U.S. from cyber attacks. "They are targeting the computer control systems that operate chemical, **electricity** and water plants, and those that guide transportation thorough the country."¶ He went on to say that the U.S. government knows of "specific instances where intruders have gained access" to these systems -- frequently known as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (or SCADA) systems -- and that "they are seeking to create advanced tools to attack these systems and cause panic, destruction and even the loss of life," according to an advance copy of his prepared remarks.¶ The secretary said that **a coordinated attack on enough critical infrastructure could be a "cyber Pearl Harbor" that would "cause physical destruction and loss of life, paralyze and shock the nation, and create a profound new sense of vulnerability.**"¶ While there have been reports of criminals using 'spear phishing' email attacks aimed at stealing information about American utilties, Panetta's remarks seemed to suggest more sophisticated, nation-state backed attempts to actually gain control of and damage power-generating equipment. ¶ Panetta's comments regarding the penetration of American utilities echo those of a private sector cyber security expert Killer Apps spoke with last week **who said that the networks of American electric companies were penetrated, perhaps in preparation for a Stuxnet-style attack**.¶ Stuxnet is the famous cyber weapon that infected Iran's uranium-enrichment centrifuges in 2009 and 2010. Stuxnet is believed to have caused some of the machines to spin erratically, thereby destroying them.¶ "**There is hard evidence** that there has been penetration of our power companies, and given Stuxnet, that is a staging step before destruction" of electricity-generating equipment, the expert told Killer Apps. Because uranium centrifuges and power turbines are both spinning machines, "**the attack is identical -- the one to take out the centrifuges and the one to take out our power systems is the same attack**."¶ "If a centrifuge running at the wrong speed can blow apart" so can a power generator, said the expert. "If you do, in fact, spin them at the wrong speeds, you can blow up any rotating device."¶ Cyber security expert Eugene Kaspersky said two weeks ago that one of his greatest fears is someone reverse-engineering a sophisticated cyber weapon like Stuxnet **-- a relatively easy task** -- and he noted that Stuxnet itself passed through power plants on its way to Iran. "Stuxnet infected thousands of computer systems all around the globe, I know there were power plants infected by Stuxnet very far away from Iran," Kaspersky said.

**Defense doesn’t apply---Stuxnet changed the game**

**Gross 11** Michael Joseph, Vanity Fair contributing editor, he covers topics including politics, technology, and national security, has also written extensively for The New York Times, The Boston Globe, and GQ, attended Williams College, and later studied at Princeton Theological Seminary. After graduating, he wrote speeches for Massachusetts Governor William Weld, “A Declaration of Cyber-War”, April, http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/04/stuxnet-201104?currentPage=all

Regardless of how well it worked, there is no question that Stuxnet is something new under the sun. At the very least, it is a blueprint for a new way of **attacking industrial-control systems**. In the end, the most important thing now publicly known about Stuxnet is that Stuxnet is **now publicly known.** That knowledge is, on the simplest level, a warning: **America’s own critical infrastructure is a sitting target for attacks like this**. That aside, if Stuxnet really did attack Iran’s nuclear program, it could be called the first unattributable act of war. The implications of that concept are confounding. Because cyber-weapons pose an almost **unsolvable problem of sourcing**—who pulled the trigger?—war could evolve into something **more and more like terror**. Cyber-conflict makes military action more like a **never-ending game of uncle**, where the fingers of weaker nations are perpetually bent back. The wars would often be secret, waged by members of anonymous, elite brain trusts, none of whom would ever have to look an enemy in the eye. For people whose lives are connected to the targets, the results could be **as catastrophic as a bombing** **raid, but would be even more disorienting**. People would suffer, but would never be certain whom to blame.¶ **Stuxnet is the Hiroshima of cyber-war**. That is its true significance, and all the speculation about its target and its source should not blind us to that larger reality. **We have crossed a threshold, and there is no turning back**.

**Grid failure wrecks US critical mission operations**

**Stockton 11** Paul, assistant secretary of defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, “Ten Years After 9/11: Challenges for the Decade to Come”, <http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=7.2.11>

The cyber threat to the DIB is only part of a much larger challenge to DoD. Potential adversaries are seeking asymmetric means to cripple our force projection, warfighting, and sustainment capabilities, by targeting the critical civilian and defense supporting assets (within the United States and abroad) on which our forces depend. This challenge is not limited to man-made threats; DoD must also execute its mission-essential functions in the face of disruptions caused by naturally occurring hazards.20 Threats and hazards to DoD mission execution include incidents such as earthquakes, naturally occurring pandemics, solar weather events, and industrial accidents, as well as kinetic or virtual attacks by state or non-state actors. Threats can also emanate from insiders with ties to foreign counterintelligence organizations, homegrown terrorists, or individuals with a malicious agenda. From a DoD perspective, this global convergence of unprecedented threats and hazards, and vulnerabilities and consequences, is a particularly problematic reality of the post-Cold War world. Successfully deploying and sustaining our military forces are increasingly a function of interdependent supply chains and privately owned infrastructure within the United States and abroad, including transportation networks, cyber systems, commercial corridors, communications pathways, and energy grids. This infrastructure largely falls outside DoD direct control. Adversary actions to destroy, disrupt, or manipulate this highly vulnerable homeland- and foreign-based infrastructure may be relatively easy to achieve and extremely tough to counter. Attacking such “soft,” diffuse infrastructure systems could significantly affect our military forces globally – potentially blinding them, neutering their command and control, degrading their mobility, and isolating them from their principal sources of logistics support. The Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) under Mission Assurance seeks to improve execution of DoD assigned missions to make them more resilient. This is accomplished through the assessment of the supporting commercial infrastructure relied upon by key nodes during execution. By building resilience into the system and ensuring this support is well maintained, DoD aims to ensure it can "take a punch as well as deliver one."21 It also provides the department the means to prioritize investments across all DoD components and assigned missions to the most critical issues faced by the department through the use of risk decision packages (RDP).22 The commercial power supply on which DoD depends exemplifies both the novel challenges we face and the great progress we are making with other federal agencies and the private sector. Today’s commercial electric power grid has a great deal of resilience against the sort of disruptive events that have traditionally been factored into the grid’s design. Yet, the grid will increasingly confront threats beyond that traditional design basis. This complex risk environment includes: disruptive or deliberate attacks, either physical or cyber in nature; severe natural hazards such as geomagnetic storms and natural disasters with cascading regional and national impacts (as in NLE 11); long supply chain lead times for key replacement electric power equipment; transition to automated control systems and other smart grid technologies without robust security; and more frequent interruptions in fuel supplies to electricity-generating plants. These risks are magnified by globalization, urbanization, and the highly interconnected nature of people, economies, information, and infrastructure systems. The department is highly dependent on commercial power grids and energy sources. As the largest consumer of energy in the United States, DoD is dependent on commercial electricity sources outside its ownership and control for secure, uninterrupted power to support critical missions. In fact, approximately 99 percent of the electricity consumed by DoD facilities originates offsite, while approximately 85 percent of critical electricity infrastructure itself is commercially owned. This situation only underscores the importance of our partnership with DHS and its work to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure – a mission that serves not only the national defense but also the larger national purpose of sustaining our economic health and competitiveness. DoD has traditionally assumed that the commercial grid will be subject only to infrequent, weather-related, and short-term disruptions, and that available backup power is sufficient to meet critical mission needs. As noted in the February 2008 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, “In most cases, neither the grid nor on-base backup power provides sufficient reliability to ensure continuity of critical national priority functions and oversight of strategic missions in the face of a long term (several months) outage.”23 Similarly, a 2009 GAO Report on Actions Needed to Improve the Identification and Management of Electrical Power Risks and Vulnerabilities to DoD Critical Assets stated that DoD mission-critical assets rely primarily on commercial electric power and are vulnerable to disruptions in electric power supplies.24 Moreover, these vulnerabilities may cascade into other critical infrastructure that uses the grid – communications, water, transportation, and pipelines – that, in turn, is needed for the normal operation of the grid, as well as its quick recovery in emergency situations. To remedy this situation, the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force recommended that DoD take a broad-based approach, including a focused analysis of critical functions and supporting assets, a more realistic assessment of electricity outage cause and duration, and an integrated approach to risk management that includes greater efficiency, renewable resources, distributed generation, and increased reliability. DoD Mission Assurance is designed to carry forward the DSB recommendations. Yet, for a variety of reasons – technical, financial, regulatory, and legal – DoD has limited ability to manage electrical power demand and supply on its installations. As noted above, DHS is the lead agency for critical infrastructure protection by law and pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7. The Department of Energy (DOE) is the lead agency on energy matters. And within DoD, energy and energy security roles and responsibilities are distributed and shared, with different entities managing security against physical, nuclear, and cyber threats; cost and regulatory compliance; and the response to natural disasters. And of course, production and delivery of electric power to most DoD installations are controlled by commercial entities that are regulated by state and local utility commissions. The resulting paradox: DoD is dependent on a commercial power system over which it does not – and never will – exercise control.

#### Military vulnerability risks eviscerates the military and risks nuclear war

The Examiner 7/27

(Robert Tilford, Graduate US Army Airborne School, Ft. Benning, Georgia, “Cyber attackers could shut down the electric grid for the entire east coast” <http://www.examiner.com/article/cyber-attackers-could-easily-shut-down-the-electric-grid-for-the-entire-east-coa>, SEH)

To make matters worse a cyber attack that can take out a civilian power grid, for example could also cripple the U.S. military.¶ The senator notes that is that the same power grids that supply cities and towns, stores and gas stations, cell towers and heart monitors also power “every military base in our country.”¶ “Although bases would be prepared to weather a short power outage with backup diesel generators, within hours, not days, fuel supplies would run out”, he said.¶ Which means military command and control centers could go dark.¶ Radar systems that detect air threats to our country would shut¶ Down completely.¶ “Communication between commanders and their troops would also go silent. And many weapons systems would be left without either fuel or electric power”, said Senator Grassley.¶ “So in a few short hours or days, the mightiest military in the world would be left scrambling to maintain base functions”, he said.¶ We contacted the Pentagon and officials confirmed the threat of a cyber attack is something very real.¶ Top national security officials—including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA Director— have said, “preventing a cyber attack and improving the nation’s electric grids is among the most urgent priorities of our country” (source: Congressional Record).¶ So how serious is the Pentagon taking all this?¶ Enough to start, or end a war over it, for sure (see video: Pentagon declares war on cyber attacks http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\_kVQrp\_D0kY&feature=relmfu ).¶ A cyber attack today against the US could very well be seen as an “Act of War” and could be met with a “full scale” US military response.¶ That could include the use of “nuclear weapons”, if authorized by the President.

**Loss of mission effectiveness causes nuclear war in every hotspot**

**Kagan and O’Hanlon 7** Frederick, resident scholar at AEI and Michael, senior fellow in foreign policy at Brookings, “The Case for Larger Ground Forces”, April 2007, http://www.aei.org/files/2007/04/24/20070424\_Kagan20070424.pdf

We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but threaten to erupt in many places where the current relative calm is tenuous. To view this as a strategic military challenge for the United States is not to espouse a specific theory of America’s role in the world or a certain political philosophy. Such an assessment flows directly from the basic bipartisan view of American foreign policy makers since World War II that overseas threats must be countered before they can directly threaten this country’s shores, that the basic stability of the international system is essential to American peace and prosperity, and that no country besides the United States is in a position to lead the way in countering major challenges to the global order. Let us highlight the threats and their consequences with a few concrete examples, emphasizing those that involve key strategic regions of the world such as the Persian Gulf and East Asia, or key potential threats to American security, such as the spread of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of the global Al Qaeda/jihadist movement. The Iranian government has rejected a series of international demands to halt its efforts at enriching uranium and submit to international inspections. What will happen if the US—or Israeli—government becomes convinced that Tehran is on the verge of fielding a nuclear weapon? North Korea, of course, has already done so, and the ripple effects are beginning to spread. Japan’s recent election to supreme power of a leader who has promised to rewrite that country’s constitution to support increased armed forces—and, possibly, even nuclear weapons— may well alter the delicate balance of fear in Northeast Asia fundamentally and rapidly. Also, in the background, at least for now, Sino Taiwanese tensions continue to flare, as do tensions between India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Venezuela and the United States, and so on. Meanwhile, the world’s nonintervention in Darfur troubles consciences from Europe to America’s Bible Belt to its bastions of liberalism, yet with no serious international forces on offer, the bloodletting will probably, tragically, continue unabated. And as bad as things are in Iraq today, they could get worse. What would happen if the key Shiite figure, Ali al Sistani, were to die? If another major attack on the scale of the Golden Mosque bombing hit either side (or, perhaps, both sides at the same time)? Such deterioration might convince many Americans that the war there truly was lost—but the costs of reaching such a conclusion would be enormous. Afghanistan is somewhat more stable for the moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing. Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few years and decades, the world is going to be a very unsettled and quite dangerous place, with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a much larger set of worries. The only serious response to this international environment is to develop armed forces capable of protecting America’s vital interests throughout this dangerous time**. Doing so requires a military capable of a wide range of missions**—including not only deterrence of great power conflict in dealing with potential hotspots in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Persian Gulf but also associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and stabilization operations. For today’s US military, which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on re-learning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a large-enough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnel intensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope there will be no such large-scale missions for a while. But preparing for the possibility, while doing whatever we can at this late hour to relieve the pressure on our soldiers and Marines in ongoing operations, is prudent. At worst, the only potential downside to a major program to strengthen the military is the possibility of spending a bit too much money. **Recent history shows no link between having a larger military and its overuse**; indeed, Ronald Reagan’s time in office was characterized by higher defense budgets and yet much less use of the military, an outcome for which we can hope in the coming years, but hardly guarantee. While the authors disagree between ourselves about proper increases in the size and cost of the military (with O’Hanlon preferring to hold defense to roughly 4 percent of GDP and seeing ground forces increase by a total of perhaps 100,000, and Kagan willing to devote at least 5 percent of GDP to defense as in the Reagan years and increase the Army by at least 250,000), we agree on the need to start expanding ground force capabilities by at least 25,000 a year immediately. Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.

#### We control empirics

Wohlforth 8—Daniel Webster Professor of Government, Dartmouth. BA in IR, MA in IR and MPhil and PhD in pol sci, Yale (William, Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War, October 2008, World Politics Vol. 61, Iss. 1; pg. 28, 31 pgs, Proquest)

Despite increasingly compelling findings concerning the importance of status seeking in human behavior, research on its connection to war waned some three decades ago.38 Yet empirical studies of the relationship between both systemic and dyadic capabilities distributions and war have continued to cumulate. If the relationships implied by the status theory run afoul of well-established patterns or general historical findings, then there is little reason to continue investigating them. **The clearest empirical implication** of the theory **is that** status **competition is unlikely to cause great power military conflict in unipolar systems**. If status competition is an important contributory cause of great power war, then, ceteris paribus, unipolar systems should be markedly less war-prone than bipolar or multipolar systems. And this appears to be the case. As Daniel Geller notes in a review of the empirical literature: "**The only polar structure that appears to influence conflict probability is unipolarity**."39 In addition, a larger number of studies at the dyadic level support the related expectation that narrow capabilities gaps and ambiguous or unstable capabilities hierarchies increase the probability of war.40 These studies are based entirely on post-sixteenth-century European history, and most are limited to the post-1815 period covered by the standard data sets. Though the systems coded as unipolar, near-unipolar, and hegemonic are all marked by a high concentration of capabilities in a single state, these studies operationalize unipolarity in a variety of ways, often very differently from the definition adopted here. An ongoing collaborative project looking at ancient interstate systems over the course of two thousand years suggests that historical systems that come closest to the definition of unipolarity used here exhibit precisely the behavioral properties implied by the theory. 41 As David C. Kang's research shows, the East Asian system between 1300 and 1900 was an unusually stratified unipolar structure, with an economic and militarily dominant China interacting with a small number of geographically proximate, clearly weaker East Asian states.42 Status politics existed, but actors were channeled by elaborate cultural understandings and interstate practices into clearly recognized ranks. Warfare was exceedingly rare, and the major outbreaks occurred precisely when the theory would predict: when China's capabilities waned, reducing the clarity of the underlying material hierarchy and increasing status dissonance for lesser powers. Much more research is needed, but initial exploration of other arguably unipolar systems-for example, Rome, Assyria, the Amarna system-appears consistent with the hypothesis.43 Status Competition and Causal Mechanisms Both theory and evidence demonstrate convincingly that competition for status is a driver of human behavior, and social identity theory and related literatures suggest the conditions under which it might come to the fore in great power relations. Both the systemic and dyadic findings presented in large-N studies are broadly consistent with the theory, but they are also consistent with power transition and other rationalist theories of hegemonic war.

### Advantage 2- Desalination

#### Global water scarcity’s inevitable–causes war and kills billions

Nitish Priyadarshi 12, lecturer in the department of environment and water management at Ranchi University in India, “War for water is not a far cry”, June 16, <http://www.cleangangaportal.org/node/44>

The battles of yesterday were fought over land. Those of today are over energy. But the battles of tomorrow may be over water. Along with population growth and increasing per capita water consumption, massive pollution of the world's surface water systems has placed a great strain on remaining supplies of clean fresh water. Global deforestation, destruction of wetlands, dumping of pesticides and fertilizer into waterways, and global warming are all taking a terrible toll on the Earth's fragile water system. The combination of increasing demand and shrinking supply has attracted the interest of global corporations who want to sell water for a profit. The water industry is touted by the World Bank as a potential trillion-dollar industry. Water has become the “blue gold” of the 21st century. In many parts of the world, one major river supplies water to multiple countries. Climate change, pollution and population growth are putting a significant strain on supplies. In some areas renewable water reserves are in danger of dropping below the 500 cubic meters per person per year considered a minimum for a functioning society. In recent times, several studies around the globe show that climatic change is likely to impact significantly upon freshwater resources availability. In India, demand for water has already increased manifold over the years due to urbanization, agriculture expansion, increasing population, rapid industrialization and economic development. At present, changes in cropping pattern and land-use pattern, over-exploitation of water storage and changes in irrigation and drainage are modifying the hydrological cycle in many climate regions and river basins of India. Due to warming and climate change rainfall trend has been badly affected worldwide. This change has adversely affected the groundwater recharge. Water scarcity is expected to become an even more important problem than it is today. In a case study of Jharkhand state of India groundwater recharging is mainly dependent on rainfall. Though Jharkhand receives sufficient amount of rainfall (900 to 1400 mm/year) but from last several years the rainfall pattern is very erratic. From last two years Ranchi city the capital of Jharkhand state received sufficient rainfall but distribution of rainfall was not uniform. It rained heavily just for two to three days in the month of August and September which resulted in heavy runoff and less infiltration affecting groundwater level. The process of urbanization and industrialization from last 20 years has caused changes in the water table of Jharkhand State of India as a result of decreased recharge and increased withdrawal. Many of the small ponds which were main source of water in the surrounding areas are now filled for different construction purpose affecting the water table. By 2100, water scarcity could impact between 1.1 and 3.2 billion people, says a leaked draft of an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report due to be published in April 2007. The report focuses on the consequences of global warming and options for adapting to them. In February 2007 the panel released a report on the scientific basis of climate change. The IPCC predicts critical water shortages in China and Australia, as well as parts of Europe and the United States. Africa and poor countries such as Bangladesh would be most affected because they were least able to cope with drought. Major cities worldwide may face a water shortage crisis by 2050 if relevant governments don't react quickly. The water shortage will mostly affect basic daily needs such as drinking, cooking, bathing and washing clothes, and the poor residents of the world's major cities in developing countries are the ones who will suffer most. "By 2050, big cities that will not have enough water available nearby include Beijing, New Delhi, Mexico City, Lagos and Tehran. China and India will be particularly hard hit unless significant new efforts are taken by their cities,". There are several principal manifestations of the water crisis. 1. Inadequate access to safe drinking water for about 884 million people. 2. Inadequate access to water for sanitation and waste disposal for 2.5 billion people. 3. Groundwater over drafting (excessive use) leading to diminished agricultural yields. 4. Overuse and pollution of water resources harming biodiversity. 5. Regional conflicts over scarce water resources sometimes resulting in warfare. Potential Hot Spots: Egypt: A coalition led by Ethiopia is challenging old agreements that allow Egypt to use more than 50 percent of the Nile’s flow. Without the river, all of Egypt would be desert. Eastern Europe: Decades of pollution have fouled the Danube, leaving down-stream countries, such as Hungary and the Republic of Moldova, scrambling to find new sources of water. Middle East: The Jordan River, racked by drought and diverted by Israeli, Syrian and the Jordanian dams, has lost 95 percent of its former flow. Former Soviet Union: The Aral sea, at one time the world’s fourth largest inland sea, has lost 75 percent of its water because of diversion programs begun in the 1960s. There are many other countries of the world that are severely impacted with regard to human health and inadequate drinking water. The following is a partial list of some of the countries with significant populations (numerical population of affected population listed) whose only consumption is of contaminated water:  Sudan: 12.3 million  Venezuela: 5.0 million  Ethiopia: 2.7 million  Tunisia: 2.1 million  Cuba :1.3 million

#### Those wars go global

Reilly ‘2

(Kristie, Editor for In These Times, a nonprofit, independent, national magazine published in Chicago. We’ve been around since 1976, fighting for corporate accountability and progressive government. In other words, a better world, “NOT A DROP TO DRINK,” <http://www.inthesetimes.com/issue/26/25/culture1.shtml>)

\*Cites environmental thinker and activist Vandana Shiva Maude Barlow and Tony Clarke—probably North America’s foremost water experts

The two books provide a chilling, in-depth examination of a rapidly emerging global crisis. “Quite simply,” Barlow and Clarke write, “unless we dramatically change our ways, between one-half and two-thirds of humanity will be living with severe fresh water shortages within the next quarter-century. … The hard news is this: Humanity is depleting, diverting and polluting the planet’s fresh water resources so quickly and relentlessly that every species on earth—including our own—is in mortal danger.” The crisis is so great, the three authors agree, that the world’s next great wars will be over water. The Middle East, parts of Africa, China, Russia, parts of the United States and several other areas are already struggling to equitably share water resources. Many conflicts over water are not even recognized as such: Shiva blames the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in part on the severe scarcity of water in settlement areas. As available fresh water on the planet decreases, today’s low-level conflicts can only increase in intensity.

#### And nuclear

Weiner ‘90

(Jonathan, Visiting Professor of Molecular Biology at Princeton University. The Next One Hundred Years: Shaping the Fate of Our Living Earth, p. 214)

If we do not destroy ourselves with the A-bomb and the H-bomb, then we may destroy ourselves with the C-bomb, the Change Bomb. And in a world as interlinked as ours, one explosion may lead to the other. Already in the Middle East, from North Africa to the Persian Gulf and from the Nile to the Euphrates, tensions over dwindling water supplies and rising populations are reaching what many experts describe as a flashpoint. A climate shift in the single battle-scarred nexus might trigger international tensions that will unleash some of the 60,000 nuclear warheads the world has stockpiled since Trinity.

#### No diplomacy or institutions

Adam Radin 10, masters in security studies from the naval postgraduate school, “the security implications of water: prospects for instability or cooperation in south and central asia”, March, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518674>

Water, an issue so important to numerous facets of each state’s economy and overall stability, must not be left to loosely observed and nonbinding agreements. Tajikistan has even gone as far as to appeal to the United Nations General Assembly to focus on the “Central Asia water dilemma.”142 In a region that is still developing, and where the government’s survival rely more on its relations with it people versus its regional neighbors, domestic needs will continue to trump international cooperation. As Linn notes in his plan, the need for global actors to take an active role is likely needed in order for sustained cooperation. Additionally, this also provides an opportunity for Russia to actively insert itself through diplomacy and infrastructural investments, seeing that they still consider the CARs under their sphere of influence.143

The chapter presents a contrasting case study to South Asia, as in Central Asia water is not viewed as a regional security issue, but in terms of fulfilling short-term domestic needs. Without the looming threat of conflict or significant retribution from regional neighbors, cooperation is consistently undervalued and abandoned once domestic pressures increase. The problem with this pattern is that resources will likely continue to deteriorate and the CARs will continue to be dependent on each other to provide water and energy. Without sustained and flexible cooperation, the region at the very least will see greater stresses on government to provide for their populations, leading to domestic and potential regional instability.

#### Water scarcity causes wars in asia

Nitish Priyadarshi 12, lecturer in the department of environment and water management at Ranchi University in India, “War for water is not a far cry”, June 16, <http://www.cleangangaportal.org/node/44>

Water stress is set to become Asia’s defining crisis of the twenty-first century, creating obstacles to continued rapid economic growth, stoking interstate tensions over shared resources, exacerbating long time territorial disputes, and imposing further hardships on the poor. Asia is home to many of the world’s great rivers and lakes, but its huge population , pollution and exploding economic and agricultural demand for water make it the most water-scare continent on a per capita basis. Many of Asia’s water sources cross national boundaries, and as less and less water is available, international tensions will rise. The poor management of river basins, environmentally unsustainable irrigation practices, an overuse of groundwater, and the contamination of water sources have all helped aggravate Asian water woes. The over exploitation of subterranean water in the large parts of the Asia has resulted in a rapidly falling groundwater saturation level- known as the water table. In the Gangetic delta, wells have tapped into naturally occurring arsenic deposits, causing millions of people in Bangladesh, and Eastern India including Jharkhand and Bihar to be exposed to high levels of poisonous arsenic in drinking water and staple agricultural products like rice. In some Asian coastal areas, the depletion of groundwater has permitted saline seawater to flow in to replace the freshwater that has been extracted. The Ganga, which is virtually synonymous with Indian civilisation, is dying. Pollution, over-extraction of water, emaciated tributaries and climatic changes are killing the mighty river, on whose fecund plains live one in 12 people of this planet. The Ganga basin makes up almost a third of India's land area and its rich soil is home to millions of people. However, indiscriminate extraction of water with modern tube wells from the river as well as its basin, coupled with the damming of its tributaries for irrigation, have seriously reduced its flow. Climate change has added to the threat. Rivers are the lifeblood of the Bangladesh economy and social life. Its cultural life is also deeply related to rivers. It is extremely unfortunately that its three main rivers, Ganges-Padma, Brahmaputra-Jamuna and Surma-Meghna are dying. As per a survey of the Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB), there are three hundred and ten rivers in Bangladesh. Out of these fifty-seven are border rivers, the condition of one hundred and seventy five is miserable, and sixty five are almost dead. Eighty percent of the rivers lack proper depth. The latest study reveals that one hundred and seventeen rivers are either dead or have lost navigability . Such rivers/canals include Brahamaputra, Padma, Mahananda, Gorai, Meghna, Titas, Gomati, Kushiara, Dhaleswari, Bhairab, Sitalksha, Turag etc. As per a report of BWDB, India is controlling the water of 57 rivers along with the Farakka barrage. Because of inadequate facilities for dredging, these rivers have become canals. Additionally, India has withdrawn water of several rivers including Surma, Kushiara and Mahananda. Sluice gates have been constructed on the rivers Senoa, Jamuna, Panga, Pan, Hatoori and Sui (situated near Panchagarh). Apart from the scourge of Farakka barrage, a new dam, named Tipaimukh dam, is under construction in India. Asia will continue to have the world’s largest number of people without basic or adequate access to water. The Asian water sector is plagued by serious problems, including inadequate infrastructure and poor system maintenance, financially strapped utilities, low-cost recovery, growing pollution, watershed degradation, and unsustainable groundwater extraction. Owing to leaks and system inefficiencies, a sizable portion of the water supply is lost before reaching the consumer. As water distress intensifies and global warming accelerates, local, national, and interstate disputes over water are likely to become endemic in Asia. Water, for its part, could trigger increased conflicts within and between states, and open new political disputes in Asia. Water shortages, likely to be aggravated by fast-rising use and climate change, pose a potential threat to political stability, economic modernization, public health, food security, and internal cohesion in a number of Asian states. A study of Asia’s biggest rivers-the Indus, the Brahmaputra, the Yangtze, the Yellow, and the Ganges-by different experts has found that the “ upstream snow and ice reserves of these basins-important in sustaining seasonal water availability- are likely to be affected substantially by climate change,” although the extent of impact will vary from basin to basin.

#### Nuclear war

**Campbell et al 8** (Kurt M, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Dr. Campbell served in several capacities in government, including as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and the Pacific, Director on theNational Security Council Staff, previously the Chief Executive Officer and co-founder of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), served as Director of the Aspen Strategy Group and the Chairman of the Editorial Board of the Washington Quarterly, and was the founder and Principal of StratAsia, a strategic advisory company focused on Asia, rior to co-founding CNAS, he served as Senior Vice President, Director of the International Security Program, and the Henry A. Kissinger Chair in National Security Policy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, doctorate in International Relation Theory from Oxford, former associate professor of public policy and international relations at the John F. Kennedy School of Government and Assistant Director of the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, member of Council on Foreign Relations and  International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Power of Balance: America in iAsia” June 2008, <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatelSingh_iAsia_June08.pdf>)

Asian *investment* is also at record levels. Asian countries lead the world with unprecedented infra­structure projects. With over $3 trillion in foreign currency reserves, Asian nations and businesses are starting to shape global economic activity. Indian firms are purchasing industrial giants such as Arcelor Steel, as well as iconic brands of its once-colonial ruler, such as Jaguar and Range Rover. China’s Lenovo bought IBM’s personal computer We call the transformations across the Asia-Pacific the emergence of “iAsia” to reflect the adoption by countries across Asia of fundamentally new stra­tegic approaches to their neighbors and the world. Asian nations are pursuing their interests with real power in a period of both tremendous potential and great uncertainty. iAsia is: *Integrating:* iAsia includes increasing economic interdependence and a flowering of multinational forums to deal with trade, cultural exchange, and, to some degree, security. *Innovating:* iAsia boasts the world’s most successful manufacturing and technology sectors and could start taking the lead in everything from finance to nanotech to green tech. *Investing:* Asian nations are developing infrastruc­ture and human capital at unprecedented rates. But the continent remains plagued by: Insecurity: Great-power rivalry is alive in Asia. Massive military investments along with historic suspicions and contemporary territorial and other conflicts make war in Asia plausible. Instability: From environmental degradation to violent extremism to trafficking in drugs, people, and weapons, Asian nations have much to worry about. *Inequality:* Within nations and between them, inequality in Asia is more stark than anywhere else in the world. Impoverished minorities in countries like India and China, and the gap in governance and capacity within countries, whether as back­ward as Burma or as advanced as Singapore, present unique challenges. A traditional approach to Asia will not suffice if the United States is to both protect American interests and help iAsia realize its potential and avoid pitfalls. business and the Chinese government, along with other Asian financial players, injected billions in capital to help steady U.S. investment banks such as Merrill Lynch as the American subprime mortgage collapse unfolded. Chinese investment funds regional industrialization, which in turn creates new markets for global products. Asia now accounts for over 40 percent of global consumption of steel 4 and China is consuming almost half of world’s available concrete. 5 Natural resources from soy to copper to oil are being used by China and India at astonishing rates, driving up commodity prices and setting off alarm bells in Washington and other Western capitals. Yet Asia is not a theater at peace. On average, between 15 and 50 people die every day from causes tied to conflict, and suspicions rooted in rivalry and nationalism run deep. The continent harbors every traditional and non-traditional challenge of our age: it is a cauldron of religious and ethnic tension; a source of terror and extrem­ism; an accelerating driver of the insatiable global appetite for energy; the place where the most people will suffer the adverse effects of global climate change; the primary source of nuclear proliferation; and the most likely theater on Earth for a major conventional confrontation and even a nuclear conflict. Coexisting with the optimism of iAsia are the ingredients for internal strife, non-traditional threats like terrorism, and traditional interstate conflict, which are all magnified by the risk of miscalculation or poor decision-making.

#### Water scarcity also causes Indo-Pak nuclear war.

Zahoor ‘11

(Musharaf, is researcher at Department of Nuclear Politics, National Defence University, Islamabad, “Water crisis can trigger nuclear war in South Asia,” <http://www.siasat.pk/forum/showthread.php?77008-Water-Crisis-can-Trigger-Nuclear-War-in-South-Asia>, AM)

South Asia is among one of those regions where water needs are growing disproportionately to its availability. The high increase in population besides large-scale cultivation has turned South Asia into a water scarce region. The two nuclear neighbors Pakistan and India share the waters of Indus Basin. All the major rivers stem from the Himalyan region and pass through Kashmir down to the planes of Punjab and Sindh empty into Arabic ocean. It is pertinent that the strategic importance of Kashmir, a source of all major rivers, for Pakistan and symbolic importance of Kashmir for India are maximum list positions. Both the countries have fought two major wars in 1948, 1965 and a limited war in Kargil specifically on the Kashmir dispute. Among other issues, the newly born states fell into water sharing dispute right after their partition. Initially under an agreed formula, Pakistan paid for the river waters to India, which is an upper riparian state. After a decade long negotiations, both the states signed Indus Water Treaty in 1960. Under the treaty, India was given an exclusive right of three eastern rivers Sutlej, Bias and Ravi while Pakistan was given the right of three Western Rivers, Indus, Chenab and Jhelum. The tributaries of these rivers are also considered their part under the treaty. It was assumed that the treaty had permanently resolved the water issue, which proved a nightmare in the latter course. India by exploiting the provisions of IWT started wanton construction of dams on Pakistani rivers thus scaling down the water availability to Pakistan (a lower riparian state). The treaty only allows run of the river hydropower projects and does not permit to construct such water reservoirs on Pakistani rivers, which may affect the water flow to the low lying areas. According to the statistics of Hydel power Development Corporation of Indian Occupied Kashmir, India has a plan to construct 310 small, medium and large dams in the territory. India has already started work on 62 dams in the first phase. The cumulative dead and live storage of these dams will be so great that India can easily manipulate the water of Pakistani rivers. India has set up a department called the Chenab Valley Power Projects to construct power plants on the Chenab River in occupied Kashmir. India is also constructing three major hydro-power projects on Indus River which include Nimoo Bazgo power project, Dumkhar project and Chutak project. On the other hand, it has started Kishan Ganga hydropower project by diverting the waters of Neelum River, a tributary of the Jhelum, in sheer violation of the IWT. The gratuitous construction of dams by India has created serious water shortages in Pakistan. The construction of Kishan Ganga dam will turn the Neelum valley, which is located in Azad Kashmir into a barren land. The water shortage will not only affect the cultivation but it has serious social, political and economic ramifications for Pakistan. The farmer associations have already started protests in Southern Punjab and Sindh against the non-availability of water. These protests are so far limited and under control. The reports of international organizations suggest that the water availability in Pakistan will reduce further in the coming years. If the situation remains unchanged, the violent mobs of villagers across the country will be a major law and order challenge for the government. The water shortage has also created mistrust among the federative units, which is evident from the fact that the President and the Prime Minister had to intervene for convincing Sindh and Punjab provinces on water sharing formula. The Indus River System Authority (IRSA) is responsible for distribution of water among the provinces but in the current situation it has also lost its credibility. The provinces often accuse each other of water theft. In the given circumstances, Pakistan desperately wants to talk on water issue with India. The meetings between Indus Water Commissioners of Pakistan and India have so far yielded no tangible results. The recent meeting in Lahore has also ended without concrete results. India is continuously using delaying tactics to under pressure Pakistan. The Indus Water Commissioners are supposed to resolve the issues bilaterally through talks. The success of their meetings can be measured from the fact that Pakistan has to knock at international court of arbitration for the settlement of Kishan Ganga hydropower project. The recently held foreign minister level talks between both the countries ended inconclusively in Islamabad, which only resulted in heightening the mistrust and suspicions. The water stress in Pakistan is increasing day by day. The construction of dams will not only cause damage to the agriculture sector but India can manipulate the river water to create inundations in Pakistan. The rivers in Pakistan are also vital for defense during wartime. The control over the water will provide an edge to India during war with Pakistan. The failure of diplomacy, manipulation of IWT provisions by India and growing water scarcity in Pakistan and its social, political and economic repercussions for the country can lead both the countries toward a war. The existent A-symmetry between the conventional forces of both the countries will compel the weaker side to use nuclear weapons to prevent the opponent from taking any advantage of the situation. Pakistan's nuclear programme is aimed at to create minimum credible deterrence. India has a declared nuclear doctrine which intends to retaliate massively in case of first strike by its' enemy. In 2003, India expanded the operational parameters for its nuclear doctrine. Under the new parameters, it will not only use nuclear weapons against a nuclear strike but will also use nuclear weapons against a nuclear strike on Indian forces anywhere. Pakistan has a draft nuclear doctrine, which consists on the statements of high ups. Describing the nuclear thresh-hold in January 2002, General Khalid Kidwai, the head of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, in an interview to Landau Network, said that Pakistan will use nuclear weapons in case India occupies large parts of its territory, economic strangling by India, political disruption and if India destroys Pakistan's forces. The analysis of the ambitious nuclear doctrines of both the countries clearly points out that any military confrontation in the region can result in a nuclear catastrophe. The rivers flowing from Kashmir are Pakistan's lifeline, which are essential for the livelihood of 170 million people of the country and the cohesion of federative units. The failure of dialogue will leave no option but to achieve the ends through military means.

#### Water scarcity causes Middle East war

Nitish Priyadarshi 12, lecturer in the department of environment and water management at Ranchi University in India, “War for water is not a far cry”, June 16, <http://www.cleangangaportal.org/node/44>

The crisis over water in the Middle East is escalating. Despite existing agreements, dwindling resources – increasingly affected by pollution, agricultural/industrial initiatives and population growth – have elevated the strategic importance of water in the region. For Middle Eastern nations, many already treading the razor’s edge of conflict, water is becoming a catalyst for confrontation – an issue of national security and foreign policy as well as domestic stability. Given water’s growing ability to redefine interstate relations, the success of future efforts to address water sharing and distribution will hinge upon political and strategic approaches to this diminishing natural resource. In the Middle East, water resources are plummeting. While representing 5% of the total world population, the Middle East & North Africa (MENA) region contains only 0.9% of global water resources.1 The number of water-scarce countries in the Middle East and North Africa has risen from 3 in 1955 (Bahrain, Jordan and Kuwait) to 11 by 1990 (with the inclusion of Algeria, Israel and the Occupied Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen). Another 7 are anticipated to join the list by 2025 (Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Libya, Morocco, Oman and Syria). In addition to its scarcity, much of Middle Eastern water stems from three major waterways: the Tigris-Euphrates, Nile and Jordan River systems. Mutual reliance on these resources has made water a catalyst for conflict, spurring confrontations such as the 1967 War (fomented by Syria’s attempts to divert water from Israel) and the Iran-Iraq War (which erupted from disputes over water claims and availability). Recognition of water’s role as an obstacle in interstate relations has spurred numerous attempts at resolution, including diplomatic efforts (most notably the 1953-1955 U.S.-brokered Johnston negotiations) and bilateral and multilateral treaty efforts, ranging from the 1959 Agreement for the Full Utilization of Nile Waters to the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian Treaty. Along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, Turkey and Syria are currently approaching a massive confrontation over water resources. Relations between the two countries, strained at best, have been exacerbated since the 1980s by growing tensions over water, which have brought them to the brink of war several times. The Jordan River Basin has also emerged as a flashpoint for conflict over water. Resources in the area, suffering serious overuse as a result of pollution and population growth, have increasingly impacted interstate relations. Between Jordan and Israel, water resource issues are reaching a fever pitch. Despite the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian Treaty – which established comprehensive guidelines regulating the distribution, preservation and availability of water from the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers – conflicts over water have risen to the forefront of relations between the two countries. Jordan, fed only by underground sources and the Jordan River, has experienced an escalating water deficit – one that is expected to reach 250 million cubic meters (nearly 1/3rd of current annual consumption) by 2010. At the same time, Israel – currently utilizing almost all available water from its National Water System (consisting of the West Bank Mountain Aquifer, the Coastal Aquifer and the Lake Kinneret Basin) – has been forced to resort to overexploitation of available resources for expanding agricultural and industrial ventures. As a result, water has become a critical bone of contention between the two countries. The historically troubled relations between Israel and the Palestinians have also been magnified by water. Mutual reliance on the West Bank Mountain Aquifer, which rests atop the demarcating border of the disputed West Bank territory (and currently provides 1/3rd of Israel’s water supply and 80% of Palestinian consumption), has created friction between the State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

#### Nuclear war

James A. **Russell,** Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

#### Desal has to double every decade

Hines et al ’11

Wesley is associate professor of nuclear engineering at the Univeristy of Tennessee and performed a study analyzing the effects of desalination with six other scientists, “Advanced Instrumentation and Control Methods for Small and Medium Reactors with IRIS demonstration,” <http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/1015813-7MUuYb/1015813.pdf>

In Figure 1.1, countries which will face “economic water shortages” (i.e. inadequacy of¶ supply and demand) are shown. According to the market survey performed by the World¶ Resources Institute on the future growth of seawater desalination, the worldwide demand for¶ desalination is expected to double approximately every 10 years in the foreseeable future. Most¶ of the demand would arise in the Arabian Gulf and North African regions, but this is likely to¶ expand to other areas.

SMRs solve—

#### Scalability

IAEA 7, “Economics of Nuclear Desalination: New Developments and Site Specific Studies”, July, <http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1561_web.pdf>

Seventy percent of the planet is covered with water, but only 2.5% of that is fresh water. Nearly 70% of this fresh water is frozen in the icecaps of Antarctica and Greenland. Most of the rest is in the form of soil moisture or in deep inaccessible aquifers or comes in the form of heavy rains and floods that are difficult to contain and exploit. Consequently, only less than 0.008% (about 70 000 km3) of the world’s water is readily accessible for direct human use, and even that is very unevenly distributed. Recent statistics show that currently 2.3 billion people live in water-stressed areas and among them 1.7 billion live in water-scarce areas, where the water availability per person is less than 1000 m3/year. In fact, the situation is expected to worsen further since, by 2025, the number of people suffering from water stress or scarcity could swell to 3.5 billion, out of which 2.4 billion would live in water-scarce regions. Water scarcity is a global issue. Every year new countries are affected by growing water problems. It is for this reason that the Millennium Declaration by UN General Assembly in 2000 set up a target to halve, by the year 2015, the world population, which is unable to reach, or to afford, safe drinking water. Vision 21: shared vision for Hygiene, Water Supply and Sanitation, has a target to provide water, sanitation and hygiene for all by 2025. Better water conservation, water management, pollution control and water reclamation are all part of the integrated solution to projected water stresses. So too are new sources of fresh water, including the desalination of seawater. Desalination technologies have been well established since the mid-20th century and widely deployed in the Middle East and North Africa. The contracted capacity of desalination plants has increased steadily since 1965 and is now about 36 million m3/day worldwide, as shown in Figure 1. This capacity could cater to world’s population roughly 6 litres a day per capita of fresh potable water. If this capacity were available to 1.5 billion in the world without direct access to drinking water, it would provide approximately 20 litres/day/capita. Large scale commercially available desalination processes can generally be classified into two categories: (a) distillation processes that require mainly heat plus some electricity for ancillary equipment, and (b) membrane processes that require only electricity. In the first category (distillation) there are two major processes: multi-stage flash (MSF) and multi-effect distillation (MED). In both processes, seawater is heated; the steam that evaporates is condensed and collected as freshwater; and the residual brine is discharged. In the second category (membranes) is the reverse osmosis process (RO), in which pure water passes from the high-pressure seawater side of a semi-permeable membrane to the low-pressure freshwater side. The pressure differential must be high enough to overcome the natural tendency for water to move from the low concentration freshwater side of a membrane to the high concentration seawater side in order to balance osmotic pressures. The energy for the desalination plants is generally supplied in the form of either steam or electricity. Conventional fossil fuel-powered plants have normally been utilized as the primary sources but their intensive use raises increasing environmental concerns, specifically in relation to greenhouse gas emissions (Section 1.3.3). The depleting sources and the future price uncertainty of the fossil fuels and their better use for other vital industrial applications are also the factors to be considered. 1.3. THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR POWER IN DESALINATION The world energy requirements are presently met from oil, coal, gas, hydro, nuclear and renewable energies in that order as shown in Table 1. It is now universally recognized that there will be an increase in the world’s requirement for electricity over the next few decades. The present trend towards meeting this demand includes the building of fossil fuel plants, particularly combined cycle gas fired plants. However, the spiralling increase in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has resulted in setting the emission targets in international meetings held at Toronto, Rio de Janeiro and Kyoto. The IAEA predicts that the GHG emissions would be 36-50% higher by 2010 compared to 1990 levels. Many analysts, therefore, feel that the only viable alternative to fossil fuels is nuclear energy to reduce the rate of increase of GHG, particularly, carbon dioxide. Yet another incentive for nuclear power is to maintain diversity of supply. A national strategy limited to one particular form of energy (fossil fuels) will be vulnerable to increased fuel costs and pressures from exporting countries. Nuclear power is a proven technology, which has provided more than 16% of world electricity supply in over 30 countries. More than ten thousand reactor-years of operating experience have been accumulated over the past 5 decades. There are many reasons which favour a possible revival of the nuclear power production in the years to come. It is thus expected that this revival would also lead to an increased role of nuclear energy in non-electrical energy services, which, at the moment, are almost entirely dominated by fossil energy sources. Among various utilization of nuclear energy for non-electrical products, using it for the production of freshwater from seawater (nuclear desalination) has been drawing broad interest in the IAEA Member States as a result of acute water shortage issues in many arid and semi-arid zones worldwide. With technical co-ordination or support of the IAEA, several demonstration programs of nuclear desalination are also in progress in several Member States to confirm its technical and economical viability under country-specific conditions The desalination of seawater using nuclear energy is a feasible option to meet the growing demand for potable water. Over 175 reactor-years of operating experience on nuclear desalination have already been accumulated worldwide. 1.3.1. Nuclear desalination In the IAEA terminology, nuclear desalination is defined to be the production of potable water from seawater in a facility in which a nuclear reactor is used as the source of energy for the desalination process. Electrical and/or thermal energy may be used in the desalination process on the same site. The facility may be dedicated solely to the production of potable water, or may be used for the generation of electricity and production of potable water, in which case only a portion of the total energy output of the reactor is used for water production. The design approaches for a nuclear desalination plant are essentially derived from those of the nuclear reactor alone, with some additional aspects to be considered in the design of a desalination plant and its integration with the nuclear system. All nuclear reactor types can provide the energy required by the various desalination processes. In this regard, it has been shown that Small and Medium Reactors (SMRs) offer the largest potential as coupling options to nuclear desalination systems in developing countries. The development of innovative reactor concepts and fuel cycles with enhanced safety features as well as their attractive economics are expected to improve the public acceptance and further the prospects of nuclear desalination. The coupling with nuclear system is not difficult technically but needs some consideration in (a) avoiding cross-contamination by radioactivity, (b) providing backup heat or power sources in case the nuclear system is not in operation (e.g. for refuelling and maintenance), (c) incorporation of certain design features, minimising the impact of the thermal desalination systems’ coupling to the nuclear reactors (Section 1.6). 1.3.2. Why nuclear desalination? The International Atomic Energy Agency is a specialized organization of the UN system that seeks to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. The institutional basis for the IAEA’s involvement in nuclear desalination is in its Statute and Medium Term Strategy. Article II of the IAEA Statute provides that: “ The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world”. This refers implicitly to nuclear desalination as an option for the use of nuclear technologies. The same applies to the Article III of the Statute, which authorizes the IAEA: “ To encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world….”; (Article III, A.1); and “To foster the exchange of scientific and technical information on peaceful uses of atomic energy.” (Article III, A.3). In addition, Objective A.3 of the Agency’s Medium Term Strategy requires the Agency: “ To support and facilitate the development of new and emerging applications of nuclear technologies by co-generation and heat applications, including seawater desalination”. Request of assessing feasibility of using nuclear energy for seawater desalination was first made by the five North African countries to the IAEA in 1989 and the General Conference adopted its resolution to resume the study. These countries are located in semi-arid zones and already suffer from water shortages. In recent years, interests have been also been indicated by Member States in South and South East Asia for the feasibility, as well as the demonstration, of nuclear desalination projects. The issue has since then been repeatedly stressed at the General Conference (Committee on the Whole) and supported by many Member States including most members of Group-77. The support stems not only from their expectation of its possible contribution to the freshwater issue but has also been motivated by a variety of reasons that include: the economic competitiveness of nuclear desalination in areas lacking cheap hydropower or fossil fuel resources, energy supply diversification, conservation of fossil fuel resources and spin-off effects of nuclear technology for industrial development. Looking to the future, there are several reasons for focusing now on expanding nuclear power’s contribution to desalination. Apart from the expanding demand for freshwater and the increasing concern about GHG emissions and pollution from fossil fuels, there is a renewed and growing emphasis on small and medium sized nuclear reactors, and this is particularly important for desalination because the countries most in need of new sources of freshwater often have limited industrial infrastructures and relatively weaker electricity grids. The size of the grid limits the possibilities for integrating a co-generating nuclear power plant into the grid to supply the electricity market, in addition to meeting the energy requirements of a desalination plant. The largest power unit that can be integrated into an electricity grid must not exceed about 10-20 % of the total grid capacity. Of course, smaller nuclear reactors would be more appropriate for remote areas that are not suitable for connections to the grid. For nuclear desalination to be attractive in any given country, two conditions have to be satisfied simultaneously: a lack of water and the ability to use nuclear energy for desalination. In most regions, only one of the two is present. Both are present for example in China, the Republic of Korea, India and Pakistan. These regions already account for almost half the world’s population, and thus represent a potential long term market for nuclear desalination. The market will expand further to the extent that regions with high projected water needs, such as the Middle East and North Africa, increase their nuclear expertise and capabilities. 1.3.3. Environmental impact of desalination by fossil fuelled energy sources Desalination is an energy intensive process. A future desalination strategy based only on the use of fossil fuelled systems is not sustainable: Fossil fuel reserves are finite and must be conserved for more important uses such as transport, petrochemical industry etc. Besides, the demands for desalted water would continue increasing as population grows and standards of living improve. Conservation measures such as the modernisation of water networks to minimise leakages, the recycling of used water etc. will certainly reduce the future water demands slightly but they would not be able to halt the dissemination of desalination plants and consequently of the fossil fuelled based systems for the production of needed electricity and heat. The following paragraphs illustrate the damaging consequences of such a policy by taking the example of the Mediterranean region. Following the recent “Blue Plan” [2], the total available natural water resources (1), based on the statistics from 1990 to 1998, in the principle countries of the Mediterranean region, are as shown in Table 2. The projected demands (3) for the year 2025 [31] are also included in Table 1. It is obvious that available natural water resources would rather decrease in 2025 because of increased pollution, over exploitation and other human activities. However, to keep matters simple, it would be supposed that they would remain at the same level as in 1998. It can be observed that, in 2025, the total projected water deficit (balance) in the Mediterranean region would of the order of 294 km3/per year. Not all this required capacity would be met by desalination plants. Current contribution of desalination is of the order of 1 to 2 %. If it is supposed that in 2025, this contribution would be about 2.5 %, then the total required desalting capacity would be 7.3 km3/year (20.1 million m3/day). According to the EC ExternE study2, the total emissions of GHG per MW(e).h of electricity produced by representative fossil fuelled power plants in France, are as presented in Table 3. The specific heat and electricity consumptions of three main desalination plants are given in Table 4, [3]. The data presented in the above Tables allows to calculate the approximate3 total GHG emissions produced by the fossil fuelled plants and the three desalination plants. Results for a total desalting capacity of 20.1 million m3/day are presented in Table 5. It can thus be concluded that for a desalting capacity of 20.1 million m3/day in the Mediterranean region alone, required in 2025, one would produce, depending upon the energy source and the desalination process used, 13 to 264 million tonnes/year of CO2. 1350 to 1 310 000 tonnes/year of SOx. 21 100 to 540 000 tonnes/year of NOx. 1190 to 40 000 tonnes/year of particles. The potential levels of GHG and particle emissions on the world scale could then be more than double these figures. These could naturally be avoided through the use of nuclear energy.

#### Key to deescalate conflicts

Palley ‘11

Reese Palley, The London School of Economics, 2011, The Answer: Why Only Inherently Safe, Mini Nuclear Power Plans Can Save Our World, p. 168-71

The third world has long been rent in recent droughts, by the search for water. In subsistence economies, on marginal land, water is not a convenience but a matter of life and death. As a result small **wars have been fought, rivers diverted, and wells poisoned in what could be a warning of what is to come as industrialized nations begin to face failing water supplies.** Quite aside from the demand for potable water is the dependence of enormous swaths of industry and agriculture on oceans of water used for processing, enabling, and cleaning a thousand processes and products. It is interesting to note that fresh water used in both industry and agriculture is reduced to a nonrenewable resource as agriculture adds salt and industry adds a chemical brew unsuitable for consumption. More than one billion people in the world already lack access to clean water, and things are getting worse. Over the next two decades, the average supply of water per person will drop by a third, **condemning millions** of people **to** waterborne **diseases** and an avoidable premature death.81 So **the stage is set for water access wars between** the **first and the third worlds**, between **neighbors** downstream of supply, between **big industry** and big agriculture, between **nations**, between **population** centers, and ultimately between you and the people who live next door for an already inadequate world water supply that is not being renewed. **As populations inevitably increase, conflicts will intensify**.82 It is only by virtue of the historical accident of the availability of nuclear energy that humankind now has the ability to remove the salt and other pollutants to supply all our water needs. The problem is that **desalination is an intensely local process**. Some localities have available sufficient water from renewable sources to take care of their own needs, but not enough to share with their neighbors, and it **is here that the scale of nuclear energy production must be defined locally.** Large scale 1,000 MWe plants can be used to desalinate water as well as for generating electricity However we cannot build them fast enough to address the problem, and, if built they would face the extremely expensive problem of distributing the water they produce. Better, much better, would be to use small desalinization plants sited locally. Beyond desalination for human use is the need to green some of the increasing desertification of vast areas such as the Sahara. Placing twenty 100 MWe plants a hundred miles apart along the Saharan coast would green the coastal area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea, a task accomplished more cheaply and quickly than through the use of gigawatt plants.83 This could proceed on multiple tracks wherever deserts are available to be reclaimed. Leonard Orenstein, a researcher in the field of desert reclamation, speculates: If most of the Sahara and Australian outback were planted with fast-growing trees like eucalyptus, the forests could draw down about 8 billion tons of carbon a year—nearly as much as people emit from burning fossil fuels today. As the forests matured, they could continue taking up this much carbon for decades.84 **The use of small, easily transported**, easily **sited**, and walk away **safe nuclear reactors dedicated to desalination is the only answer** to the disproportionate distribution of water resources that have distorted human habitation patterns for millennia. Where there existed natural water, such as from rivers, great cities arose and civilizations flourished. Other localities lay barren through the ages. We now have the power, by means of SMRs profiled to local conditions, not only to attend to existing water shortages but also to smooth out disproportionate water distribution and create green habitation where historically it has never existed. **The endless wars that have been fought**, first over solid bullion gold and then over oily black gold, **can now engulf us in the desperate reach for liquid blue gold. We need never fight these wars again as we now have the nuclear power to fulfill the** biblical **ability to “strike any local rock and have water gush forth**.”

#### It’s economically viable

Gamini Seneviratne 7, Nuclear News’s Vienna Correspondent, “Research projects show nuclear

desalination economical”, April, <http://www.ans.org/pubs/magazines/nn/docs/2007-4-3.pdf>

The desalination of seawater using nuclear power is cost-effective compared with other primary energies, according to researchers in 10 countries who have studied various options at specific sites in their own countries. Their findings show nuclear to be at least competitive in all cases. Researchers from Argentina, China, Egypt, France, India, Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Syria, and the United States focused on the economics of producing potable water by using various desalination technologies and energy sources at particular sites. The participants followed an agreed procedure throughout a coordinated research project (CRP), Economics of Nuclear Desalination— New Developments and Site-specific Studies, set up by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The findings of the studies, carried out over three years and ending in November 2006, are included in a technical document (IAEA-TECDOC) already at the printer. “There is a dire shortage of fresh water for drinking in many countries already, and when you realize that 70 percent of the planet is covered with water but only 2.5 percent of that is fresh water, it is hardly surprising,” Ibrahim Khamis, who heads the IAEA’s desalination unit, told Nuclear News. He added that 70 percent of that fresh water is frozen in the polar icecaps and Greenland, and most of the rest is in soil moisture, inaccessible underground aquifers, or comes as heavy rain that is difficult to capture. “So only some 0.008 percent, about 70 000 km3, is readily available, and even that is very unevenly distributed.” According to Khamis, recent statistics show 2.3 billion people living in water stressed areas, 1.7 billion of them in areas where the availability is on average less than 1000 m3 a year. Given human population growth and the increasing demands of industry and agriculture, the projections point to a continuously worsening situation, even if the effects of global warming are not taken into account. Khamis said he foresaw a time when nuclear power will be sought for desalination rather than for electricity generation, at least in some specific regions of the world such as the Middle East. “You can live without electricity for quite a long time; without water, only a matter of days.” The U.S. study, which was undertaken by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), notes that “the need for fresh water, high-purity water, and other grades of water for various domestic, industrial, and agricultural applications is ever increasing in the United States.” Demand is driven mainly by population, as well as continuous economic and technological growth, and it is predicted that more than an additional 60 billion m3 of water a year will be needed for municipal and light industrial uses by the year 2020. An additional 11–19 liters per day per person will be needed to generate hydrogen, should transportation be based mainly on hydrogen-powered vehicles in the future. “Cogeneration of water and power could offer a major portion of the additional water needed, in addition to providing much needed energy for maintaining sustainable development and growth,” the ANL report says. The IAEA report says that desalinating seawater is not the only solution under discussion for remedying the water scarcity, but it is an important one. There are essentially two methods: distillation using heat, and the use of membranes and electricity directly. The two main distillation modes, known as multistage flash (MSF) and multieffect distillation (MED), both involve heating seawater to produce steam, followed by evaporation, condensation, and, finally, pure water collection. The method using membranes, which is called reverse osmosis (RO), uses electricity to create a pressure differential across a semipermeable membrane, allowing fresh water to pass through to the low-pressure side, and leaving salty seawater on the high-pressure side. Desalination plant capacity worldwide is close to 40 million m3 today, mostly by distillation using fossil energy, and mostly in the Middle East and North Africa. Nuclear desalination has so far been exclusively for use within the nuclear power plants themselves, except at the Soviet-built BN-350 fast reactor in Aktau, Kazakhstan, which supplied potable water to local communities until it was shut down in 1999. Currently, only India supplies nuclear desalinated water outside the plant site. Having earlier used MSF to get plant-use water, it has also integrated RO to the desalination unit at its Kalpakkam pressurized heavy-water reactor (PHWR) in Chenai, and it has begun (experimentally) supplying some water outside the power station. Pakistan has begun a similar project at its Karachi nuclear power plant (KANUPP) to couple a 1600 m3/day MED unit to the nuclear plant, which earlier operated a 454 m3/day RO facility for plant use. Fresh water is needed for many purposes. Saudi Arabia alone already irrigates crops with desalinated water. A number of countries, notably Egypt, the Persian Gulf States, Israel, Jordan, and Libya, depend on the technology to maintain tourism. Khamis said nuclear desalination has been held back by two key factors: economics, and the unavailability of reactors of appropriate size. The CRP addressed the former, comparing cost performance between reactor plus desalination method combinations. The perception that nuclear is less cost-effective than other energy sources was repudiated by the studies. The report says that the country case studies “have shown that in general, the nuclear desalination costs can vary from $0.5 to $0.94/m3 for RO, from $0.6 to $0.96/m3 for MED, and from $1.18 to $1.48/m3 for MSF plants. All nuclear options are economically attractive as compared with the gas turbine combined-cycle–based desalination systems, as long as gas prices remain higher than $150/toe [metric tons oil equivalent] or $21/bbl [barrel].”

#### Plan accesses a huge export market

Rosner and Goldberg 11

Robert Rosner, Stephen Goldberg, Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, The Harris School of Public Policy Studies, November 2011, SMALL MODULAR REACTORS –KEY TO FUTURE NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION IN THE U.S., <https://epic.sites.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/EPICSMRWhitePaperFinalcopy.pdf>

Previous studies have documented the potential for a significant export market for U.S. SMRs, mainly in lesser developed countries that do not have the demand or infrastructure to accommodate GW-scale LWRs. Clearly, the economics of SMR deployment depends not only on the cost of SMR modules, but also on the substantial upgrades in all facets of infrastructure requirements, particularly in the safety and security areas, that would have to be made, and as exemplified by the ongoing efforts in this direction by the United Arab Emirates (and, in particular, by Abu Dhabi). This is a substantial undertaking for these less developed countries. Thus, such applications may be an attractive market opportunity for FOAK SMR plants, even if the cost of such plants may not have yet achieved all of the learning benefits.

The Department of Commerce has launched the Civil Nuclear Trade Initiative, which seeks to identify the key trade policy challenges and the most significant commercial opportunities. The Initiative encompasses all aspects of the U.S. nuclear industry, and, as part of this effort, the Department identified 27 countries as “markets of interest” for new nuclear expansion. A recent Commerce Department report identified that “SMRs can be a solution for certain markets that have smaller and less robust electricity grids and limited investment capacity.” Studies performed by Argonne National Laboratory suggest that SMRs would appear to be a feasible power option for countries that have grid capacity of 2,000-3,000 MW. Exports of SMR technology also could play an important role in furthering non-proliferation policy objectives. The design of SMR nuclear fuel management systems, such as encapsulation of the fuel, may have non-proliferation benefits that merit further assessment. Also, the development of an SMR export industry would be step toward a U.S.-centric, bundled reliable fuel services.

### Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should obtain, through alternative financing, electricity from small modular reactors for military bases in the United States.

### Solvency

#### Military procurement solves commercial and islanding- avoid regulation

Andres and Loudermilk 10

(Richard B. Andres, Professor of ¶ national Security Strategy at the ¶ national War College and a Senior fellow and energy and environmental ¶ Security and Policy Chair in the Center ¶ for Strategic research, institute for national Strategic Studies, at the national Defense University, Micah J, Research Associate for the Energy & Environmental Security Policy program with the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, “Small Reactors and the Military’s Role in Securing America’s Nuclear IndustryPosted” <http://robertmayer.wordpress.com/2010/08/28/small-reactors-and-the-militarys-role-in-securing-americas-nuclear-industryposted/>, SEH)

Unlike private industry, the military does not face the same regulatory and congressional hurdles to constructing reactors and would have an easier time in adopting them for use. By integrating small nuclear reactors as power sources for domestic U.S. military bases, three potential energy dilemmas are solved at the same time. First, by incorporating small reactors at its bases, the military addresses its own energy security quandary. The military has recently sought to “island” its bases in the U.S. -protecting them from grid outages, be they accidental or intentional. The Department of Defense has promoted this endeavor through lowering energy consumption on bases and searching for renewable power alternatives, but these measures alone will prove insufficient. Small reactors provide sufficient energy output to power military installations and in some cases surrounding civilian population centers.¶ Secondly, as the reactors become integrated on military facilities, the stigma on the nuclear power industry will ease and inroads will be created for the adoption of small-scale reactors as a viable source of energy. Private industry and the public will see that nuclear reactors can indeed be utilized safely and effectively, resulting in a renewed push toward the expansion of nuclear power. Although many of the same hurdles will still be in place, a shift in public opinion and a stronger effort by utilities, coupled with the demonstrated success of small reactors on military bases, could prove the catalysts necessary for the federal government and the NRC to take more aggressive action.¶ Finally, while new reactors are not likely in the near future, the military’s actions will preserve, for a while longer, the badly ailing domestic nuclear energy industry. Nuclear power is here to stay around the globe, and the United States has an opportunity to take a leading role in supplying the world’s nuclear energy and reactor technology. With the U.S. nuclear industry dormant for three decades, much of the attention, technology, and talent have concentrated overseas in countries with a strong interest in nuclear technology. Without the United States as a player in the nuclear energy market, it has little say over safety regulations of reactors or the potential risks of proliferation from the expansion of nuclear energy. If the current trend continues, the U.S. will reach a point where it is forced to import nuclear technology and reactors from other countries. Action by the military to install reactors on domestic bases will both guarantee the survival of the American nuclear industry in the short term, and work to solidify support for it in the long run.¶ Ultimately, between small-scale nuclear reactors and the U.S. military, the capability exists to revitalize America’s sleeping nuclear industry and promoting energy security and clean energy production. The reactors offer the ability to power domestic military bases, small towns, and other remote locations detached from the energy grid. Furthermore, reactor sites can house multiple units, allowing for greater energy production – rivaling even large reactors. Small reactors offer numerous benefits to the United States and a path initiated by the military presents a realistic route by which their adoption can be achieved.

#### Alternative financing cuts costs and supercharges commercialization

Fitzpatrick 11

Ryan Fitzpatrick, Senior Policy Advisor for Clean Energy at Third Way, Josh Freed, Vice President for Clean Energy at Third Way, and Mieke Eoyan, Director for National Security at Third Way, June 2011, Fighting for Innovation: How DoD Can Advance CleanEnergy Technology... And Why It Has To, content.thirdway.org/publications/414/Third\_Way\_Idea\_Brief\_-\_Fighting\_for\_Innovation.pdf

The DoD has over $400 billion in annual purchasing power, which meansthe Pentagon could provide a sizeable market for new technologies. This can increase a technology’s scale of production, bringing down costs, and making the product more likely to successfully reach commercial markets. Unfortunately, many potentially significant clean energy innovations never get to the marketplace, due to a lack of capital during the development and demonstration stages. As a result, technologies that could help the military meet its clean energy security and cost goals are being abandoned or co-opted by competetors like China before they are commercially viable here in the U.S. By focusing its purchasing power on innovative products that will help meet its energy goals, DoD can provide more secure and cost-effective energy to the military—producing tremendous long-term savings, while also bringing potentially revolutionary technologies to the public. Currently, many of these technologies are passed over during the procurement process because of higher upfront costs—even if these technologies can reduce life-cycle costs to DoD. The Department has only recently begun to consider life-cycle costs and the “fullyburdened cost of fuel” (FBCF) when making acquisition decisions. However, initial reports from within DoD suggest that the methodology for determining the actual FBCF needs to be refined and made more consistent before it can be successfully used in the acquisition process.32 The Department should fast-track this process to better maximize taxpayer dollars. Congressional appropriators— and the Congressional Budget Office—should also recognize the savings that can be achieved by procuring advanced technologies to promote DoD’s energy goals, even if these procurements come with higher upfront costs. Even if the Pentagon makes procurement of emerging clean energy technologies a higher priority, it still faces real roadblocks in developing relationships with the companies that make them. Many clean energy innovations are developed by small businesses or companies that have no previous experience working with military procurement officers. Conversely, many procurement officers do not know the clean energy sector and are not incentivized to develop relationships with emerging clean energy companies. Given the stakes in developing domestic technologies that would help reduce costs and improve mission success, the Pentagon should develop a program to encourage a better flow of information between procurement officers and clean energy companies—especially small businesses. Leverage Savings From Efficiency and Alternative Financing to Pay for Innovation. In an age of government-wide austerity and tight Pentagon budgets, current congressional appropriations are simply not sufficient to fund clean energy innovation. Until Congress decides to direct additional resources for this purpose, the Defense Department must leverage the money and other tools it already has to help develop clean energy. This can take two forms: repurposing money that was saved through energy efficiency programs for innovation and using alternative methods of financing to reduce the cost to the Pentagon of deploying clean energy. For several decades the military has made modest use alternative financing mechanisms to fund clean energy and efficiency projects when appropriated funds were insufficient. In a 2010 report, GAO found that while only 18% of renewable energy projects on DoD lands used alternative financing, these projects account for 86% of all renewable energy produced on the Department’s property.33 This indicates that alternative financing can be particularly helpful to DoD in terms of bringing larger and more expensive projects to fruition. One advanced financing tool available to DoD is the energy savings performance contract (ESPC). These agreements allow DoD to contract a private firm to make upgrades to a building or other facility that result in energy savings, reducing overall energy costs without appropriated funds. The firm finances the cost, maintenance and operation of these upgrades and recovers a profit over the life of the contract. While mobile applications consume 75% of the Department’s energy,34 DoD is only authorized to enter an ESPC for energy improvements done at stationary sites. As such, Congress should allow DoD to conduct pilot programs in which ESPCs are used to enhance mobile components like aircraft and vehicle engines. This could accelerate the needed replacement or updating of aging equipment and a significant reduction of energy with no upfront cost. To maximize the potential benefits of ESPCs, DoD should work with the Department of Energy to develop additional training and best practices to ensure that terms are carefully negotiated and provide benefits for the federal government throughout the term of the contract.35 This effort could possibly be achieved through the existing memorandum of understanding between these two departments.36 The Pentagon should also consider using any long-term savings realized by these contracts for other energy purposes, including the promotion of innovative technologies to further reduce demand or increase general energy security. In addition to ESPCs, the Pentagon also can enter into extended agreements with utilities to use DoD land to generate electricity, or for the long-term purchase of energy. These innovative financing mechanisms, known respectively as enhanced use leases (EULs) and power purchase agreements (PPAs), provide a valuable degree of certainty to third party generators. In exchange, the Department can leverage its existing resources—either its land or its purchasing power—to negotiate lower electricity rates and dedicated sources of locallyproduced power with its utility partners. DoD has unique authority among federal agencies to enter extended 30-year PPAs, but only for geothermal energy projects and only with direct approval from the Secretary of Defense. Again, limiting incentives for clean energy generation to just geothermal power inhibits the tremendous potential of other clean energy sources to help meet DoD’s energy goals. Congress should consider opening this incentive up to other forms of clean energy generation, including the production of advanced fuels. Also, given procurement officials’ lack of familiarity with these extended agreements and the cumbersome nature of such a high-level approval process, the unique authority to enter into extended 30-year PPAs is very rarely used.37 DoD should provide officials with additional policy guidance for using extended PPAs and Congress should simplify the process by allowing the secretary of each service to approve these contracts. Congress should also investigate options for encouraging regulated utility markets to permit PPA use by DoD. Finally, when entering these agreements, the Department should make every effort to promote the use of innovative and fledgling technologies in the terms of its EULs and PPAs. CON C L U S ION The Defense Department is in a unique position to foster and deploy innovation in clean energy technologies. This has two enormous benefits for our military: it will make our troops and our facilities more secure and it will reduce the amount of money the Pentagon spends on energy, freeing it up for other mission critical needs. If the right steps are taken by Congress and the Pentagon, the military will be able to put its resources to work developing technologies that will lead to a stronger fighting force, a safer nation, and a critical emerging sector of the American economy. The Defense Department has helped give birth to technologies and new economic sectors dozens of times before. For its own sake and the sake of the economy, it should make clean energy innovation its newest priority.

#### DoD key

Glen Butler, Lt. Col., 2011, Not Green Enough, [www.mca-marines.org/gazette/not-green-enough](http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/not-green-enough)

SMRs have relatively low plant cost, can replace aging fossil plants, and do not emit greenhouse gasses. Some are as small as a “hot tub” and can be stored underground, dramatically increasing safety and security from terrorist threats.25 Encouragingly, in fiscal year 2010 (FY10) the DoE allocated $0 to the U.S. SMR Program; in FY11, they’ve requested $38.9 million. This funding is to support two main activities—public/private partnerships to advance SMR designs and research and development and demonstrations. According to the DoE’s website, one of the planned program accomplishments for FY11 is to “collaborate with the Department of Defense (DoD) . . . to assess the feasibility of SMR designs for energy resources at DoD installations.”26 The Marine Corps should vigorously seek the opportunity to be a DoD entity providing one platform for this feasibility assessment.27 Fourth, SMR technology offers the Marine Corps another unique means to lead from the front—not just of the other Services but also of the Nation, and even the world.28 This potential Pete Ellis moment should be seized. There are simple steps we could take, and others stand ready to lead if we are not.30 But the temptation to “wait and see” and “let the others do it; then we’ll adopt it” mentality is not always best. Energy security demands boldness, not timidity. To be fair, nuclear technology comes with challenges, of course, and with questions that have been kicked around for decades. An April 1990 Popular Science article asked, “Next Generation Nuclear Reactors—Dare we build them?” and included some of the same verbiage heard in similar discussions today.31 Compliance with National Environment Policy Act requirements necessitates lengthy and detailed preaction analyses, critical community support must be earned, and disposal challenges remain. Still, none of these hurdles are insurmountable. Yet despite the advances in safety, security, and efficiency in recent years, nuclear in the energy equation remains the new “n-word” for most military circles. And despite the fact that the FY10 National Defense Authorization Act called on the DoD to “conduct a study [of] the feasibility of nuclear plants on military installations,” the Office of the Secretary of Defense has yet to fund the study. Fifth, the cumbersome, bureaucratic certification process of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), often enough to scare away potential entrepreneurs and investors, is not necessarily a roadblock to success. The NRC is “responsible for licensing and regulating the operation of commercial nuclear power plants in the United States.” Military installations offer unique platforms that could likely bypass an extended certification process. With established expertise and a long safety record in nuclear reactor certification, operations, training, and maintenance, the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program comprises the civilian and military personnel who: . . . design, build, operate, maintain, and manage the nuclear-powered ships and the many facilities that support the U.S. nuclear-powered naval fleet.”34 Bypassing the NRC and initiating SMR experimentation under ADM Hyman Rickover’s legacy umbrella of naval reactors could shorten the process to a reasonable level for Marine and naval installations.35

#### DOD key- prevents unfavorable lock-in

Andres and Breetz 11

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Technological Lock-in. A second risk is that if ¶ small reactors do reach the market without DOD assistance, the designs that succeed may not be optimal for ¶ DOD’s applications. Due to a variety of positive feedback and increasing returns to adoption (including demonstration effects, technological interdependence, network and learning effects, and economies of scale), the ¶ designs that are initially developed can become “locked ¶ in.”¶ 34¶ Competing designs—even if they are superior in ¶ some respects or better for certain market segments—¶ can face barriers to entry that lock them out of the market. If DOD wants to ensure that its preferred designs ¶ are not locked out, then it should take a first mover role ¶ on small reactors. ¶ It is far too early to gauge whether the private ¶ market and DOD have aligned interests in reactor designs. On one hand, Matthew Bunn and Martin Malin argue that what the world needs is cheaper, safer, ¶ more secure, and more proliferation-resistant nuclear ¶ reactors; presumably, many of the same broad qualities would be favored by DOD.¶ 35¶ There are many varied ¶ market niches that could be filled by small reactors, ¶ because there are many different applications and settings in which they can be used, and it is quite possible that some of those niches will be compatible with ¶ DOD’s interests.¶ 36¶ On the other hand, DOD may have specific needs ¶ (transportability, for instance) that would not be a high ¶ priority for any other market segment. Moreover, while ¶ DOD has unique technical and organizational capabilities that could enable it to pursue more radically innovative reactor lines, DOE has indicated that it will ¶ focus its initial small reactor deployment efforts on ¶ LWR designs.¶ 37¶ If DOD wants to ensure that its preferred reactors ¶ are developed and available in the future, it should take ¶ a leadership role now. Taking a first mover role does not ¶ necessarily mean that DOD would be “picking a winner” ¶ among small reactors, as the market will probably pursue multiple types of small reactors. Nevertheless, DOD ¶ leadership would likely have a profound effect on the industry’s timeline and trajectory.

#### They have the personnel

Robitaille 12

(George, Department of Army Civilian, United States Army War College, “Small Modular Reactors: The Army’s Secure Source of Energy?” 21-03-2012, Strategy Research Project)

Section 332 of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), “Extension and Expansion of Reporting Requirements Regarding Department of Defense Energy Efficiency Programs,” requires the Secretary of Defense to evaluate the cost and feasibility of a policy that would require new power generation projects established on installations to be able to provide power for military operations in the event of a commercial grid outage.28 A potential solution to meet this national security requirement, as well as the critical needs of nearby towns, is for DoD to evaluate SMRs as a possible source for safe and secure electricity. Military facilities depend on reliable sources of energy to operate, train, and support national security missions. The power demand for most military facilities is not very high, and could easily be met by a SMR. Table 1 provides the itemized description of the annual energy requirements in megawatt of electricity (MWe) required for the three hundred seventy four DoD installations.29 DoD History with SMRs The concept of small reactors for electrical power generation is not new. In fact, the DoD built and operated small reactors for applications on land and at sea. The U.S. Army operated eight nuclear power plants from 1954 to 1977. Six out of the eight reactors built by the Army produced operationally useful power for an extended period, including the first nuclear reactor to be connected and provide electricity to the commercial grid. 30 The Army program that built and operated compact nuclear reactors was ended after 1966, not because of any safety issues, but strictly as a result of funding cuts in military long range research and development programs. In essence, it was determined that the program costs could only be justified if there was a unique DoD specific requirement. At the time there were none.31 Although it has been many years since these Army reactors were operational, the independent source of energy they provided at the time is exactly what is needed again to serve as a secure source of energy today. Many of the nuclear power plant designs used by the Army were based on United States Naval reactors. Although the Army stopped developing SMRs, the Navy as well as the private sector has continued to research, develop, and implement improved designs to improve the safety and efficiency of these alternative energy sources. The U.S. Navy nuclear program developed twenty seven different power plant systems and almost all of them have been based on a light water reactor design.32 This design focus can be attributed to the inherent safety and the ability of this design to handle the pitch and roll climate expected on a ship at sea. To date, the U. S Navy operated five hundred twenty six reactor cores in two hundred nineteen nuclear powered ships, accumulated the equivalent of over six thousand two hundred reactor years of operation and safely steamed one hundred forty nine million miles. The U.S. Navy has never experienced a reactor accident.33 All of the modern Navy reactors are design to use fuel that is enriched to ninety three percent Uranium 235 (U235) versus the approximate three percent U235 used in commercial light water reactors. The use of highly enriched U235 in Navy vessels has two primary benefits, long core lives and small reactor cores.34 The power generation capability for naval reactors ranges from two hundred MWe (megawatts of electricity) for submarines to five hundred MWe for an aircraft carrier. A Naval reactor can expect to operate for at least ten years before refueling and the core has a fifty year operational life for a carrier or thirty to forty years for a submarine.35 As an example, the world’s first nuclear carrier, the USS Enterprise, which is still operating, celebrated fifty years of operations in 2011.36 The Navy nuclear program has set a precedent for safely harnessing the energy associated with the nuclear fission reaction. In addition, the Navy collaborates with the private sector to build their reactors and then uses government trained personnel to serve as operators. Implementing the use of SMRs as a secure source of energy for our critical military facilities will leverage this knowledge and experience.

# 2AC

## Topicality

### 2AC

#### 1. We meet- plan creates incentives and secures a market for nuclear energy

#### 2. We meet- paying them is the financial incentive

#### 3. Counter interpretation- financial incentives are disbursement of public funds or contingent commitments

Webb 93

(lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa (Kernaghan, “Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives”, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501 (1993) Hein Online)

In this paper, "financial incentives" are taken to mean disbursements 18 of public funds or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures.19 Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behaviour may vary with the type of incentive in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies.20 In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created.21 Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used.22 And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration.¶ By limiting the definition of financial incentives to initiatives where *public funds are either disbursed or contingently committed*, a large number of regulatory programs with incentive *effects* which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming,23 are excluded from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as *indirect* incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, thedefinition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well.24 Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and *ad hoc* industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to *encourage* behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.

#### Power contracts are incentives

ICTSD 11

ICTSD Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainable Energy, Nov. 2011, Fostering Low Carbon Growth: The Case for a Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement, http://ictsd.org/i/publications/117557/?view=details

b. Production-related incentives help lower the cost of producing sustainable energy. However, unlike investment incentives that are paid based on initial capital costs, production- related incentives are paid per Kilowatt hour (Kwh) of electricity generated. They are superior to investment tax credits in that they are paid on the basis of actual electricity generated, so there is no incentive for investors to artificially inflate investment costs or set up installations simply to claim tax credits. On the other hand, they may be affected by future changes in policy and cutbacks, so the degree of predictability is lower and political risk higher. Production incentives commonly take the form of:

- Preferential power tariffs that pro-vide the producer with an incentive over and above the tariffs paid for conventional energy sources; these preferential power tariffs compensate the producer for higher costs associated with renewable energy generation. These tariffs may take the form of ‘feed-in’ tariffs that are paid to the power producer by an electric utility, as mandated by law, for a specific duration of time.28

- Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) are reliable power purchase contracts with the purchase guaranteed for a certain number of years. This has been cited as perhaps the single most critical requirement of a successful renewable energy project. The vast majority of renewable energy projects have been implemented by independent power producers that are not affiliated with utilities. These producers thus need to have access to the utility’s transmission and distribution grid and to obtain a contract to sell the power either to the utility or to a third party by wheeling through the utility grid. Because renewable energy projects are generally considered risky by financial institutions, a reliable, stable long-term revenue stream is extremely important for obtaining financing at a reasonable cost. Creation of reliable power markets for independent power producers has thus been the cornerstone of essentially every successful renewable energy strategy. Of course, simply ensuring a PPA may not incentivise investors unless the tariff that is reflected (whether ‘feed-in’ or some other form of preferential tariff arrived at through negotiations or bidding) is attractive enough for the producer.

#### Ground- it is grounded in the literature and is the only way to intrinsically keep military affs in the topic which are key to beat states counterplans, and it links much harder to disads

#### Predictability- our evidence has a definitive list and an intent to define, and is supported in the literature

#### Limits- only adds procurement affs to their list, but limits out all indirect incentive effects their allows

#### Education- key to talk about different actors use of energy and how energy’s connection to the military, and no aff makes sense where the government is the consumer

#### Reasonability key to prevent a race to the most limiting definition

#### Not Bidirectional- has to be towards power use

## DoE CP

**CP is a logical result of alternative financing**

**GAO 9**, “Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Address Challenges in Meeting Federal

Renewable Energy Goals”, December, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/299755.html>

DOD has also joined with private sector entities, entering into various types of arrangements to develop renewable energy projects. Because these different arrangements with the private sector provide DOD with an alternative to using only up-front appropriations to fund renewable energy projects, we refer to these arrangements as alternative financing approaches. For the purposes of this report, we define an alternative financing approach as any funding arrangement **other than projects** in which total project costs are funded **only** through full up- front appropriations. DOD has entered into several different types of these approaches that have resulted in renewable energy projects.

#### Microgrids fail

Daniel Sater 11, Research Fellow at Global Green USA’s Security and Sustainability Office, “Military Energy Security: Current Efforts and Future Solutions”, August, <http://globalgreen.org/docs/publication-185-1.pdf>

Cybersecurity remains one of the leading challenges impeding the development of a smart grid. In January 2011, the GAO published a report on the progress being made on cybersecurity as it related to smart grids71. Unfortunately, the report did not specifically address microgrids. The GAO found six challenges, however, to the development of a smart grid. The DOD is nonetheless well suited to handle the challenges listed by the GAO and the confinement of microgrids to military installations should mitigate many cybersecurity risks. The challenges listed by the GAO and the advantages of military microgrids for cybersecurity appear below. Challenge 1: Aspects of the regulatory environment may make it difficult to ensure smart grid systems’ cybersecurity. The federal government and state governments regulate electricity production and distribution. Having multiple entities produce regulations can lead to conflicting rules and thus confusion. Microgrids on military installations should avoid many of the regulatory issues the GAO found with the smart grid. The confinement of microgrids to military bases means that only the DOD will have regulatory control over them. There is precedent for states to exempt military installations from state regulations. According to a different GAO report, states often excluded military installations from their renewable energy-production goals.72 Furthermore, it is unlikely that any state government would want to get into the politically untenable battle with the Pentagon over issuing competing regulations governing military bases. Challenge 2: Utilities are focusing on regulatory compliance instead of comprehensive security. Microgrid cybersecurity will benefit from having the same entity, the DOD, issue the microgrid regulations and own the microgrids. Utilities have little incentive to invest in security measures past the bare minimum necessary for regulatory compliance. However, unlike a utility, the DOD will suffer in the event of a cybersecurity failure and thus has incentives to pursue comprehensive security. Challenge 3: The electric industry does not have an effective mechanism for sharing information on cybersecurity. Different utility companies across different states do not have a central authority analogous to that which military bases have in the Pentagon. Though there will certainly be bureaucracy, the DOD has more capacity to share information about cybersecurity and cyber-attacks than utilities. Challenge 4: Consumers are not adequately informed about the benefits, costs, and risks associated with smart grid systems. The DOD can take steps to inform all of its employees about microgrids in ways that may not be available to utilities to inform their customers. The DOD could require short classes on the benefits and risks of microgrids for all its employees and more rigorous education for its base commanders and others making decisions about grid implementation. A utility company cannot require its customers to take a class. A utility’s best option for educating its customers would be to send out information packets with monthly bills and hope that consumers read them. Challenge 5: There is a lack of security features being built into certain smart grid systems. Given the importance of the DOD’s mission and the potentially catastrophic repercussions of lax cybersecurity, the Pentagon will not take the security of its microgrids lightly, especially with the recent publication of the “Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace.”73 Challenge 6: The electricity industry does not have metrics for evaluating cybersecurity. The lack of evaluation metrics is a serious problem, but the DOD could instruct USCYBERCOM to create a specific set of metrics for microgrid development.

#### More ev—DOD study

S.B. Van Broekhoven et al june ‘12 N. Judson S.V.T. Nguyen W.D. Ross, “Microgrid Study:

Energy Security for DoD Installations,” AM

Cyber security concerns are a significant detriment to microgrid development. The DoD should

develop/certify a set of DIACAP-approved devices that can be used across the services for energy

management systems.

### Cant Solve

**DOE can’t solve procurement**

Hayward et al 10

Steven Hayward, AEI Resident Scholar, Mark Muro, Brookings Institute Metropolitan Policy Program, Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger, Breakthrough institute cofounders, October 2010, Post-Partisan Power, thebreakthrough.org/blog/Post-Partisan Power.pdf

In addition to reforming energy deployment subsidies and launching a new competitive deployment strategy, the nation should once again leverage the power of federal procurement to establish demanding requirements to drive innovation and improvement in new energy technologies. The DOD has a long track record of using the power of procurement to successfully drive the commercialization and improvement of new technologies, many of which later spun off into broader commercial adoption. **In contrast, the DOE has no way to either procure or use energy technologies at commercial scale**. The DOD should help fill this void, once again using procurement to advance a range of potential dual-use energy innovations.

### Disaster Relief Add On

#### Power outages kill disaster relief operations

Brookings and Hoover 11, The Brookings Institution Energy Security Initiative, The Hoover Institution Shultz-Stephenson Task Force on Energy Policy, “Assessing the Role of Distributed Power Systems in the U.S. Power Sector”, October, <http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Distributed-Energy.pdf>

The DOD has a substantial portfolio of real estate, including more than 500,000 buildings totaling nearly 2.2 billion sq. feet, approximately 3 times the total square footage occupied by the world’s WalMarts.79 Once seen simply as staging areas, bases have now become increasingly mission-critical, as was demonstrated during Hurricane Katrina, in which much of the relief effort was carried out from military bases. The Department of Homeland Security has also developed plans to have military bases be a key point of response in the event of a major terrorist incident. Given their new roles, the supply of uninterruptable, secure power to these facilities is now a necessity.80 In the view of the military, the assurance of such supply is not possible through sole reliance on the civilian power grid. As a 2008 DOD report noted: “Critical national security and Homeland defense missions are at an unacceptably high risk of extended outage from failure of the grid.”81 The report recommended that the military “reduce the risk to critical missions at fixed installations from loss of commercial power and other critical national infrastructure.” Military concerns over power disruption extend beyond bases themselves. The prospect of an extended outage to defense production equipment suppliers—either through unintentional disruption or through cyber-attacks such as that in September 2011 on Mitsubishi, the Japanese government’s largest arms supplier—present an additional serious and credible threat. Iran famously was set back for several years by the Stuxnet worm, which badly crippled Iran’s nuclear capability.82 According to senior military officials interviewed for this study, there are concerns that a similar attack in the United States could cripple Untied States military capabilities.

#### Extinction

Reiffel 5 (Lex, Brookings Institution, “Reaching Out: Americans Serving Overseas,” The Brookings Institution, [www.brookings.edu/views/papers/20051207rieffel.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/20051207rieffel.pdf))

The devastation of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina at the end of August 2005 was another blow to American self-confidence as well as to its image in the rest of the world. It cracked the veneer of the society reflected in the American movies and TV programs that flood the world. It exposed weaknesses in government institutions that had been promoted for decades as models for other countries. Internal pressure to turn America’s back on the rest of the world is likely to intensify as the country focuses attention on domestic problems such as the growing number of Americans without health insurance, educational performance that is declining relative to other countries, deteriorating infrastructure, and increased dependence on foreign supplies of oil and gas. A more isolationist sentiment would reduce the ability of the USA to use its overwhelming military power to promote peaceful change in the developing countries that hold two-thirds of the world’s population and pose the gravest threats to global stability. Isolationism might heighten the sense of security in the short run, but it would put the USA at the mercy of external forces in the long run. Accordingly, one of the great challenges for the USA today is to build a broad coalition of like-minded nations and a set of international institutions capable of maintaining order and addressing global problems such as nuclear proliferation, epidemics like HIV/AIDS and avian flu, failed states like Somalia and Myanmar, and environmental degradation. The costs of acting alone or in small coalitions are now more clearly seen to be unsustainable. The limitations of “hard” instruments of foreign policy have been amply demonstrated in Iraq. Military power can dislodge a tyrant with great efficiency but cannot build stable and prosperous nations. Appropriately, the appointment of Karen Hughes as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs suggests that the Bush Administration is gearing up to rely more on “soft” instruments.

## Encroachment

#### Our authors conclude aff

Andres and Breetz 11

Richard Andres, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, and Hanna Breetz, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Small Nuclear Reactorsfor Military Installations:Capabilities, Costs, andTechnological Implications, [www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf)

Small reactors used on domestic military bases are likely to face a number of additional siting hurdles. As a distributed energy source, they are likely to face substan- tial “not-in-my-backyard” battles. Moreover, dispersing a large number of reactors leads to questions about long- term nuclear waste disposal.27 Arguably, reactors should be relatively safe on domestic military installations, certainly more secure than, for instance, the reactors situated in de- veloping countries or intended for processing tar sands. Nevertheless, no issue involving nuclear energy is simple. Institutional and technical uncertainties—such as the se- curity of sealed modules, the potential and unintended social and environmental consequences, or the design of reliable safeguards—make dispersing reactors across the country challenging. Some key issues that require consid- eration include securing sealed modules, determining how terrorists might use captured nuclear materials, carefully considering the social and environmental consequences of dispersing reactors, and determining whether Permissive Action Links technology could be used to safeguard them. Using the emerging technology at expeditionary loca- tions carries far greater risks. Besides the concerns outlined above, forward located reactors could be subject to attack. Today, forward operating bases in Iraq and Afghanistan are regularly subjected to mortar attacks, suggesting that reactors at such locations could make these bases prime targets for attack. Since forward bases are also subject to capture, any design proposal that envisions deployment at forward operating bases must incorporate contingency plans in the event that reactors fall into enemy hands. Despite these potential events, a cost-benefit analysis should shape any decisions regarding the use of small reactors domestically or at forward locations. The real risks of deploying this technology should be put in perspective. The Navy has deployed more than 500 nuclear reactors since 1948 and never experienced a reactor accident. Further, in the current global context, every year the

#### Uniqueness disproves the link—Military engagement overcomes opposition, checks spillover to other issues—neg author

Amanda Boccuti, GIS Support Analyst, Marstel-Day, LLC, Lauren Faul, Strategic Communications Analyst, Marstel-Day, LLC , Lauren Gray, Environmental Issues Researcher, Marstel-Day, LLC., 5/21/12, Establishing Creative Strategies for Effective Engagement Between Military Installations & Communities, engagingcities.com/article/establishing-creative-strategies-effective-engagement-between-military-installations-communi

Marstel-Day, LLC, a woman-owned, conservation consulting firm, helps identify those interest nexuses and facilitates interactions to overcome the challenges of collaborative planning efforts. The company specializes in negotiating the nuanced engagement process and helps military installations maximize the effectiveness of existing outreach and engagement mechanisms. Military installation encroachment control assessments and engagement strategies are company products that streamline and focus the communication process to resolve specific encroachment issues, identify strategies to sustain ongoing engagement with citizens, and ultimately promote military-community planning. Marstel-Day’s analysts, planners and strategists work closely with military clients to interview installation personnel, review internal installation documents, and then conduct the same outreach with key community leaders and organizations. The findings of this process yield an analysis of key concerns and corresponding management actions. Inherent to the process is community engagement; that is, as many stakeholders as possible have the opportunity to express their concerns, goals and views, which are synthesized and folded into the broader analysis. Historically, the services and DoD use a variety collaborative tools to engage and work with the public. For example, the Joint Land Use Study (JLUS) is a tool that communities can use to initiate military-community planning. Other historic compatible-use studies such as the Air Installation Compatibility Study (AICUZ), the Range Air Installation Compatibility study (RAICUZ), the Range Compatible Use study (RCUZ), and the Army’s Operational Noise Management Plan process have been used to coordinate with local communities or in conjunction with JLUS studies. Regional habitat protection programs, land use forums, and climate change adaptation plans all constitute opportunities for communities and military installations to synchronize their efforts to reduce encroachment.. Where possible, stakeholders are encouraged to participate in all of the above studies and community coordinating activities, as well as the more recent encroachment vulnerability assessments. Pursuing a variety of collaborative encroachment management and planning options continues to prove critical for the military and communities seeking installation mission sustainment and community growth and quality of life. Establishing creative strategies to further effective engagement between military installations and communities can help resolve many of the issues that seem at first irresolvable.

#### SMRS supply power to local communities- takes out the DA

King 11

Marcus King, Ph.D., Center for Naval Analyses Project Director and Research Analyst for the Environment and Energy TeamLaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, March 2011, Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S.Military Installations, www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear Power on Military Installations D0023932 A5.pdf

Electricity control capabilities, such as self-healing and optimization of assets to increase operational efficiency, could improve overall power availability; however, they are not necessary for the integration of small nuclear power plants. Key components for improving electricity control include advanced electricity meters and electricity meter data management. These tools are needed in order to establish islanding, a condition in which a portion of the utility system, which contains both load and generation, is isolated from the remainder of the utility system and continues to operate. Since the power generation capacities of small nuclear power plants are larger than required for most DoD bases, islanding could extend to adjacent communities if sufficient technical upgrades were performed to systems outside of the installation. This contributes to DoD missions because civilians and service members working on the installation often live with their families in adjacent communities. The power would ensure that critical services such as emergency response, waste water treatment, and hospitals could be maintained.

#### Newest polls show reactors are popular

NEI 9-19

Nuclear Energy Institute, “Americans' Support for Nuclear Energy Solidifies, New National Survey Shows,” <http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/newsreleases/americans-support-for-nuclear-energy-solidifies-new-national-survey-shows/>

Americans continue to strongly support nuclear energy as an important technology to meet the nation’s future electricity demands, according to a new national survey.¶ In the telephone survey of 1,000 U.S. adults, 65 percent of respondents said they favor the use of nuclear energy as one of the ways to provide electricity in the United States, with 29 percent opposed. Those strongly favoring nuclear energy outnumber those strongly opposed by a two-to-one ratio, 29 percent versus 14 percent, according to the survey conducted Sept. 14-16 by Bisconti Research Inc. with GfK Roper. The survey has a margin of error of plus or minus three percentage points.¶ Seventy-one percent of Americans favored the use of nuclear energy in a survey by Bisconti Research/GfK Roper in February 2011, one month before the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Six months after the accident that occurred in March 2011, 62 percent of respondents favored the use of nuclear energy, with 35 percent opposed.¶ “In the surveys conducted this year and the latter part of 2011 we see not only significant and steady support for nuclear energy overall but confidence that nuclear power plants are being operated safely,” said Ann Bisconti, president of Bisconti Research. “Confidence in the safe operation of the plants and recognition of their benefits is the linchpin to public support.”¶ The new survey shows that 76 percent of respondents agree that nuclear energy facilities operating in the United States are “safe and secure,” while only 19 percent think they are not. Eighty percent of Americans (vs. 16 percent) believe “we should learn the lessons from the Japanese accident and continue to develop advanced nuclear energy plants to meet America’s growing electricity demand.”¶ The strong majority support for nuclear energy extends across a number of metrics:¶ 81 percent of those surveyed favor the renewal of operating licenses of facilities that continue to meet federal safety standards.¶ 74 percent believe electric utilities should prepare now so they will be ready to build new nuclear power plants in the next decade if needed.¶ 69 percent would find a new reactor acceptable at the site of the nearest operating nuclear power plant.¶ Nuclear energy facilities operating in 31 states supply electricity to one of every five U.S. homes and businesses.¶ Seventy-eight percent of Americans associate nuclear energy “a lot or a little” with reliable electricity, 72 percent with clean air, 69 percent with energy independence and 73 percent with affordable electricity.¶ The solidified support for nuclear energy shown by the survey echoes the bipartisan support that nuclear energy receives in Congress and general policy alignment for nuclear energy in the presidential campaigns.¶ “The guiding principles established by President Obama and Governor Romney on nuclear energy are quite similar and supportive in contrast with their differences on other energy issues,” said Alex Flint, NEI senior vice president for governmental affairs.¶ One facet of energy policy is safely and securely managing used nuclear fuel from nuclear energy facilities. As Congress considers recommendations from the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future on a new path for used nuclear fuel management, 80 percent of Americans believe that the federal government should develop a final disposal facility that meets U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations. In the meantime, 62 percent agree that uranium fuel rods are safely stored at nuclear energy facility, 27 percent disagree. However, 78 percent agree that it is more appropriate that fuel be consolidated at one or two storage sites in volunteer communities where it can be securely and efficiently managed.¶ With more than 200 new reactors being built or planned globally, three-fourths (74 percent) of those surveyed agreed that it is “important for the U.S. nuclear industry to continue to play a leading role in world markets.” Eighty-five percent believe that America “should be a leader in global nuclear energy trade so that we can influence nuclear safety and keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists.”

#### Species loss won’t snowball or threaten human life

Moore ‘98

(Senior Fellow – Hoover Institute, Climate of Fear, Pg. 99)

Nevertheless, the loss of a class of living being does not typically threaten other species. Most animals and plants can derive their nutrients or receive the other benefits provided by a particular species from more than a single source. If it were true that the extinction of a single species would produce a cascade of losses, then the massive extinctions of the past should have wiped out all life. Evolution forces various life forms to adjust to change. A few may not make the adaptation but others will mutate to meet the new conditions. Although a particular chain of DNA may be eliminated through the loss of a species, other animals or plants adapting to the same environment often produce similar genetic solutions with like proteins. It is almost impossible to imagine a single species that, if eliminated, would threaten us humans.

## Sequester

#### Plan shields controversy

**Appelbaum 12**

Binyamin, Defense cuts would hurt scientific R&D, experts say, The New York Times, 1-8, <http://hamptonroads.com/2012/01/defense-cuts-would-hurt-scientific-rd-experts-say>

Sarewitz, who studies the government's role in promoting innovation, said the Defense Department had been more successful than other federal agencies because it is the main user of the innovations that it finances. The Pentagon, which spends billions each year on weapons, equipment and technology, has an unusually direct stake in the outcome of its research and development projects.¶ "The central thing that distinguishes them from other agencies is that they are the customer," Sarewitz said. "You can't pull the wool over their eyes."¶ Another factor is the Pentagon's relative insulation from politics, which has allowed it to sustain a long-term research agenda in controversial areas**.** No matter which party is in power, the Pentagon has continued to invest in clean-energy technology, for example, in an effort to find ways to reduce one of its largest budget items, energy costs.

#### Won’t pass and capital not key

Marcus 1/3

(The Washington Post¶ January 3, 2013 Thursday ¶ Regional Edition¶ The no-big-deal deal¶ BYLINE: Ruth Marcus¶ SECTION: EDITORIAL COPY; Pg. A17)

Still, the ultimate blame lies with the House Republican caucus, which spurned two deals (the collapsed Obama-Boehner plan during the debt-ceiling fight in 2011 and the collapsed Obama-Boehner plan to avoid the cliff) that were far better, from the point of view of debt reduction, than what ended up passing.¶ The most effective communicator wielding the bulliest of pulpits could not prevail with a crowd this entrenched in anti-tax craziness.¶ History offers scant basis for optimism about the prospects for success with the coming cliffs: the postponed sequester, the return of the debt ceiling, the expiration of the continuing resolution to fund the government.¶ The White House theory is these forcing mechanisms will provide the spur for additional tax revenue, obtained through tax reform, coupled with spending cuts in the form of changes to entitlement programs. Hence, if not a grand bargain, a good-enough one, just down the road.¶ But where does the deal leave the administration's leverage to obtain more in tax increases? Certainly not increased from where it was before.¶ The cliff just dodged represented a point of maximum power to extract new revenue. Why would an already irrationally intransigent House be more compliant under less pressure?¶ More likely, the administration's bargaining power for more taxes is significantly reduced - or, looked at another way, Republicans' ability to extract painful entitlement cuts as a price of new revenue has been significantly enhanced. Emphasis, here, on the word painful. Entitlement reform is necessary, but it should be done with care for the most vulnerable.

#### Plan popular in Congress- Only 1 vote against it and both parties cosponsor

Pendidikan ‘11

Cinta writes for the Love and Like Education Blog, “Sanders is the Sole Vote Against Small Modular Reactor Research,” <http://loveandlikeeducation.blogspot.com/2011/08/bernie-sanders-and-small-modular.html>

Sanders is Sole Vote Against Small Modular Reactor Research¶ Bernie Sanders and Small Modular Reactors¶ Senator Bernie Sanders often speaks about his opposition to Vermont Yankee as having something to do with the age of the plant, the fact it is owned by Entergy, or his "state's rights" stance about regulating nuclear power plants.¶ Recently, however, Sanders made it clear that he is against nuclear power in any form and is proud of that opinion. On Senator Sanders website, he featured the fact that he was the only vote against "a pair of measures that would promote the development of small modular reactors."¶ One of these measures was the Nuclear Power Act S512. This act would authorize the Secretary of Energy to start a cost-shared program for development of small modular reactors (SMRs).¶ This act had strong bi-partisan support, being sponsored by 3 Republican and 4 Democratic Senators. The act requires research and development funds for SMRs. The Act is still in process, and does not have a firm dollar amount attached, but the dollar amount is likely to be small (in government terms, at least.). Current estimates are $100 million per fiscal year for four years, starting next year.¶ The act also requires that industry cost-share the expense. If industry doesn't think it is worth spending money on the research, the research will not receive government funding either.¶ As a background to the probable cost of this Act, we should note that President Obama requested $4.8 billion dollars for Department of Energy research, of which $3.2 billion is allocated for renewable energy and energy efficiency research. (This number has changed with the debt deal, but new numbers are not available at this time.)¶ Small Modular Reactors for The Future¶ Sander's opposition to this Nuclear Power Act will hurt America's chances to develop an important new exportable technology. Outside of Europe, the nuclear renaissance remains in full swing, with reactors being ordered and built in Arabia, China, India and Southeast Asia. Developing a strong set of SMR designs would be America's best chance to re-entering the world market for nuclear power.¶ SMRs are modular (assembled in a factory and delivered to the site), small (50 to 225 MW) and have many safety features, such as passive cooling. SMRs are expected to have a huge international market. They suitable for many places that do not have the population density or money for the current crop of huge reactors (1200 MW, built on site at great expense). SMRs would make nuclear power affordable and salable many places.¶ Westinghouse and Babcock & Wilcox have invested significant amounts of their own money in developing these products. The NRC is also active in assessing preliminary designs. At another Senate committee meeting on SMRs, Commissioner Magwood of the NRC said that he does not expect decisions made by the NRC to be the critical factor in the success or failure of SMRs. Magwood noted that SMRs have passive safety features and large water inventories; these would be considered during license review.¶ America Fallen Behind¶ America has fallen far behind the rest of the world in most nuclear technologies. Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) and Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) were developed in this country. They are being sold all over the world, but not by United States companies. We're out of the running. Other countries licensed and improved our original technologies. Companies from France, Korea, Russia and China compete to build large reactors in China, Arabia, and Southeast Asia.¶ Three American companies have put millions of dollars into the development of SMRs: Westinghouse, Babcock & Wilcox, and NuScale (a small start-up). Many people in the nuclear industry feel that the race to develop the first successful SMR is a truly high-stakes race, being fought at the level of nationwide efforts. Luckily, SMR development has bi-partisan support, and Mr. Sanders was alone in his opposition to supporting American industry efforts to develop these plants.¶ Should Government Be Involved?¶ Of course, one can make a case that the government should get out of the energy research business altogether. If Senator Sanders wished to save tax dollars by cutting all energy-research programs, he might have a valid case. However, if the government does plan to spend money on energy research, cost-sharing with industry on a new nuclear technology is certainly a far better use of funds than many of the projects in the swollen DOE renewable budget.

#### Winners win - even controversial policies boost Obama’s capital

Singer 9 (Juris Doctorate candidate at Berkeley Law, Jonathon, “By Expending Capital, Obama Grows His Capital,” 3/3/2009, <http://www.mydd.com/story/2009/3/3/191825/0428>)

Despite the country's struggling economy and vocal opposition to some of his policies, President Obama's favorability rating is at an all-time high. Two-thirds feel hopeful about his leadership and six in 10 approve of the job he's doing in the White House. "What is amazing here is how much political capital Obama has spent in the first six weeks," said Democratic pollster Peter D. Hart, who conducted this survey with Republican pollster Bill McInturff. "And against that, he stands at the end of this six weeks with as much or more capital in the bank." Peter Hart gets at a key point. Some believe that political capital is finite, that it can be used up. To an extent that's true. But it's important to note, too, that political capital can be regenerated -- and, specifically, that when a President expends a great deal of capital on a measure that was difficult to enact and then succeeds, he can build up more capital. Indeed, that appears to be what is happening with Barack Obama, who went to the mat to pass the stimulus package out of the gate, got it passed despite near-unanimous opposition of the Republicans on Capitol Hill, and is being rewarded by the American public as a result.

#### Debt ceiling fight already beginning

Politico 1-1

“Enjoy the Fiscal Cliff Debate? Just Wait for the Debt Ceiling,” <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/enjoy-the-fiscal-cliff-debate-just-wait-for-the-debt-ceiling-85649.html>

The fiscal cliff has consumed Washington for months, but it may end up being the long opening act for a fiscal drama with even higher stakes: the debt ceiling.¶ Even as senators breathed a sigh of relief and overwhelmingly passed a historic tax deal to avert the much-feared fiscal cliff early Jan. 1, Congress was already lurching right into the new round of brinksmanship.

#### EPA appointment thumps

Clean Air Report 1/3/2013

(Clean Air Report¶ January 3, 2013¶ JACKSON RESIGNATION MAY TRIGGER TOUGH SENATE FIGHT OVER NEXT EPA CHIEF¶ SECTION: Vol. 24 No. 1)

Focus will now shift to candidates to replace Jackson, a list that is also said to include California Air Resources Board Chairwoman Mary Nichols and former Pennsylvania environment secretary Kathleen McGinty.¶ But given expected gridlock in the 113th Congress, one energy expert has said that the next nominee for EPA Administrator "will have a hellish confirmation process," regardless of their background. During Jackson's tenure, House Republicans have offered strong opposition to the agency's regulatory agenda, raising concerns about the cost of EPA rules and claiming that the agency is waging a regulatory "war" on the coal sector.

#### Hagel nomination drains capital

Bloomberg 12-30

“Obama’s Political, Policy, and Pentagon Position,” <http://www.bendbulletin.com/article/20121230/NEWS0107/212300381/>

President Barack Obama faces a growing dilemma in his choice of a new defense secretary to succeed Leon Panetta.¶ Having dropped U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice and named Massachusetts Democratic Sen. John Kerry to replace Hillary Clinton as secretary of state, Obama runs the risk of appearing weak if he bows to political opposition again and chooses someone other than former Nebraska Republican senator Chuck Hagel to lead the Pentagon.¶ Picking another candidate would show for a second time “that the president’s important choices for personnel can be vetoed by two or three senators," said Sean Kay, a professor of politics and government at Ohio Wesleyan University in Delaware, Ohio, who specializes in U.S. foreign and defense policy. “The White House will come out of this significantly weakened."¶ If Obama sticks with Hagel in the face of opposition from an ad hoc coalition of Republican advocates of muscular defense policies, Democratic supporters of Israel and gay rights activists, though, Obama might be forced to spend political capital he needs for the bigger battle over the federal budget and deficit reduction.

#### Obama capital fails

Rubin 12-31

Jennifer is the conservative commentator for the Washington Post and a “this Week” panelist, “Obama Just makes it worse,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2012/12/31/obama-just-makes-it-worse/>

¶ Let’s get this straight: The president can’t make a deal with the speaker of the House on the fiscal cliff. He then punts to the Senate Majority and Minority leaders, but alas Sen. Harry Reid (D-Nev.) can’t even come up with a counteroffer. Reid then punts to Vice President Joe Biden, who presumably is more skilled than the president at this sort of thing. One is tempted to ask what President Obama really does all day.¶ ¶ President Obama’s absence might contribute to deal-making (Jason Reed/Reuters)¶ ¶ The answer is neatly summed up by Yuval Levin:¶ ¶ The president’s appearance on Meet the Press [Sunday] was downright pathetic in this regard, as have been his various press statements in the past few days. This sort of preening and lecturing from a politician who has basically just failed to do his job is bizarre.¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ Mr. President, you’re going to sign whatever congress ultimately passes, assuming something passes. Sometimes that’s just how it is for a president, any president. Can we not just accept that? And if the fiscal cliff is followed immediately by the next round of debt-ceiling talks, might we just start those with House-Senate negotiations and have them pass a bill and send it down the street like they’re supposed to, rather than go through weeks of pointless private White House drama and public presidential hectoring about how reasonable Barack Obama is compared to everybody else?¶ ¶ The only quibble I would have is that this conduct is hardly “bizarre.” It’s typical of the narcissistic behavior that this president has exhibited these past four years. ¶ ¶ It was telling, as a fellow conservative mentioned to me on Sunday, that in Obama’s Meet the Press interview he declared that the Newtown massacre was the worst day of his presidency. The conservative exclaimed: “It had nothing to do with Obama or his presidency!” She was right, of course. It was the worst day ever for those parents and that community, but Obama’s inserting himself in others’ tragedy reminds us that it is always about Obama — except when it comes to failure or scandal. (For the real worst day of his presidency there are many contenders: Fumbling the grand bargain in 2011; surprising the Israeli prime minister with his “1967 borders” speech; the 2010 election shellacking; the death of four Americans due to his administration’s negligence in Benghazi; etc.).¶ ¶ Bad results are never Obama’s fault; bad things are caused by other people. He is there to remind us he feels more deeply, is more reasonable and is more high minded than the rest of us.¶ ¶ Meanwhile, if we use a mortal standard for rating him and his presidency – say, competence — he doesn’t get a passing grade. At this point every Clinton, Bush or Reagan White House veteran could figure out where the deal is. But if we posit that Obama is anything but dim, then we must conclude Obama either perpetually assumes that his aura will magically melt opposition (his favorite method being a campaign bustrip that only annoys his opponents) or that he never intends to make true compromises (in the case of the fiscal cliff, real entitlement reform). Either way, the result is never a grand or mini-deal. We get no deal and Obama’s scorn for political opponents who won’t take “yes” for an answer. Sanctimony is the operating emotion for this White House.¶ ¶ We see the exact same process now playing out that we saw in the 2011 debt-ceiling deal, aptly documented in Bob Woodward’s The Price of Politics. In the end, grown-ups (not including the president) have to do the hard work.¶ ¶ Obama wanted revenue on the table. He got revenue. He then wanted a huge amount of revenue, higher than any serious bipartisan commission or group to date has proposed, and nothing on the entitlement front. He can say as many times as he likes that he met the GOP halfway, but it doesn’t make it so. (If you doubt it, think how much more favorable to the GOP would be the president’s own Simpson-Bowles debt commission proposal.) If Bill Clinton were president we could have had a dozen deals by now on everything from Social Security to tax reform to defense spending. He both wanted to be a maker-of-deals and had the skills to make it happen. Neither can be said of Obama.¶ ¶ The bad news in this is that the president is likely to behave no better in the debt ceiling fight. He is bound and determined, it seems, to avoid making the hard calls on fiscal sobriety. He is not in the business of disappointing the left by containing the size of government. He perhaps has convinced himself that entitlement reform isn’t so urgent, something to be fobbed off on the next Oval Office occupant.¶ ¶ Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), the ranking member on the Senate Budget Committee, is onto something in demanding a halt to this Lucy-and-the-football routine. In a written statement last night he suggested:¶ ¶ “The biggest obstacle we face is that President Obama and Majority Leader Reid continue to insist on new taxes that will be used to fund more new spending, not for meaningful deficit reduction. The result is nearly $9 trillion in new debt accumulation over the next decade, which represents virtually no change from current projections. By now, it should be clear to all that secret negotiations are not working. In the new year, the Senate must return to the difficult but necessary process of open, public legislative work that this chamber was conceived to carry out.”¶ ¶ That may not happen in this round. But come the fight on the debt ceiling it seems that is the appropriate avenue for the GOP. Pass a debt ceiling bill complete with entitlement and tax reform. Send it to the Senate and insist Reid and his fellow Democrats do their work. No more closed-door haggling. Pass a bill, send it back to the House and then fight it out. Meanwhile, President Obama can go play golf, which come to think of it might be a positive contribution to the process.

#### AT Econ

#### Impact is gradual and will be resolved later

Chait 11/8

NY Mag (Jonathan, Erskine Bowles Bids to Spoil Obama Second Term, nymag.com/daily/intel/2012/11/erskine-bowles-bids-to-spoil-obama-second-term.html)

That is totally false.¶ Going over the fiscal cliff and then doing nothing for another year would mean a huge tax hike and spending cut. But waiting until January would mean extremely gradual tax increases and spending cuts, ones that would not even begin to take place immediately, because Obama has the ability to delay their implementation. And even after they're implemented, the effect would be gradual, and could subsequently be canceled out. It’s like saying if you go three weeks without food you’ll die so if dinner isn’t on the table at 6 o'clock sharp terrible consequences will follow.¶ The reason many liberals want to wait until January is that it would make a deal much easier to strike, and ensure that the result is on more liberal terms. Once the entire Bush tax cuts have expired, President Obama would no longer have to pry revenue out of tax-hating Republicans. He’ll have all the revenue he wants and more. He could offer them a tax cut. He’ll likewise have huge defense cuts to bargain away.

#### Consensus of experts concur – no war.

Jaroslav 10

(Tir Jaroslav, Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia. The Journal of Politics, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict”, 2010, Volume 72: 413-425, Hopkins)

Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.[14](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#fn14) The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature. In accordance with the insignificant relationships of Models 1–2 and 5–6, Ostrom and Job ([1986](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref68)), for example, note that the likelihood that a U.S. President will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the public’s attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic problem, thus reducing the inclination to act abroad. Similarly, Fordham ([1998a](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref22), [1998b](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref23)), DeRouen ([1995](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref17)), and Gowa ([1998](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref34)) find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore, Leeds and Davis ([1997](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref50)) conclude that the conflict-initiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani ([2005](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref69)) and Russett and Oneal ([2001](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref73)) in global studies. In contrast and more in line with my findings of a significant relationship (in Models 3–4), Hess and Orphanides ([1995](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref38)), for example, argue that economic recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordham’s ([2002](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref24)) revision of Gowa’s ([1998](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref34)) analysis shows some effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake ([2002](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref19)) report that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s attention from a poor economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal and Russett ([1997](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref66)) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett ([1990](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref72))—but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and Pickering ([2007](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref49)) report some significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski ([2008](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref84)) find a clearer link between economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my own inconsistent findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.[15](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#fn15) Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the economy would take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy).

## Critique

**At: Violence Impacts – Democracy Solves**

**Democratic safeguards prevent genocidal violence**

Rosemary H. T.  **O’Kane 1997**. Emeritus Professor of Comparative Political Theory at Keene University. “Modernity, the Holocaust, and politics”, Economy and Society, February.

**Chosen policies cannot be relegated to the position of immediate condition** (Nazis in power) **in the explanation of the Holocaust.**  **Modern bureaucracy is not ‘intrinsically capable of genocidal action’** (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror**. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends.** As Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR have shown, furthermore, **those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity.** The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But **it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies, exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economice pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method.** By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very ‘ordinary and common’ attributes of truly modern societies**. It is these very ordinary and common attributes of modernity which stand in the way of modern genocides.**

### Threats are Real

#### Threats are not socially constructed- decision makers use the most objective, rational, and accurate assessments possible- there are no bureaucratic or ideological motivations to invent threats.

Ravenal ‘9

[Earl C. Ravenal, distinguished senior fellow in foreign policy studies @ Cato, is professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. He is an expert on NATO, defense strategy, and the defense budget. He is the author of *Designing Defense for a New World Order.* What's Empire Got to Do with It? The Derivation of America's Foreign Policy.” *Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society* 21.1 (2009) 21-75]

Quite expectedly, the more doctrinaire of the non-interventionists take pains to deny any straightforward, and therefore legitimate, security motive in American foreign and military policy. In fact, this denial leads to a more sweeping rejection of any recognizably rational basis for American foreign policy, and, even, sometimes (among the more theoretical of the non-interventionists), a preference for non-rational accounts, or “models,” of virtually any nation’s foreign policy-making.4 One could call this tendency among anti-imperialists “motive displacement.” More specifically, in the cases under review here, one notes a receptivity to any reworking of history, and any current analysis of geopolitics, that denigrates “the threat”; and, along with this, a positing of “imperialism” (the almost self-referential and primitive impulse) as a sufficient explanation for the often strenuous and risky actions of great powers such as the United States. Thus, not only is “empire” taken to be a sufficient and, in some cases, a necessary condition in bringing about foreign “threats”; but, by minimizing the extent and seriousness of these threats, the anti-imperialists put themselves into the position of lacking a rational explanation for the derivation of the (pointless at best, counter-productive at worst) policies that they designate as imperialistic. A pungent example of this threat denigration and motive displacement is Eland’s account of American intervention in the Korean and Vietnam wars:

After North Korea invaded, the Truman administration intervened merely for the purpose of a demonstration to friends and foes alike. Likewise, according to eminent cold war historians, the United States did not inter- vene in Vietnam because it feared communism, which was fragmented, or the Soviet Union, which wanted détente with the West, or China, which was weak, but because it did not want to appear timid to the world. The behavior of the United States in both Korea and Vietnam is typical of imperial powers, which are always concerned about their reputation, pres- tige, and perceived resolve. (Eland 2004, 64)

Of course, the motive of “reputation,” to the extent that it exists in any particular instance, is a part of the complex of motives that characterize a great power that is drawn toward the role of hegemon (not the same thing as “empire”). Reputation is also a component of the power projec- tion that is designed to serve the interest of national security. Rummaging through the concomitants of “imperialism,” Eland (2004, 65) discovers the thesis of “threat inflation” (in this case, virtual threat invention): Obviously, much higher spending for the military, homeland security, and foreign aid are required for a policy of global intervention than for a policy of merely defending the republic. For example, after the cold war, the security bureaucracies began looking for new enemies to justify keeping defense and intelligence budgets high. Similarly, Eland (ibid., 183), in a section entitled “Imperial Wars Spike Corporate Welfare,” attributes a large portion of the U.S. defense budget—particularly the procurement of major weapons systems, such as “Virginia-class submarines . . . aircraft carriers . . . F-22 fighters . . . [and] Osprey tilt-rotor transport aircraft”—not to the systemically derived requirement for certain kinds of military capabilities, but, rather, to the imperatives of corporate pork. He opines that such weapons have no stra- tegic or operational justification; that “the American empire, militarily more dominant than any empire in world history, can fight brushfire wars against terrorists and their ‘rogue’ state sponsors without those gold- plated white elephants.”

The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly (not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section:

In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects— a.k.a. pork—funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182)

Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes:

Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly.

There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general.

This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense.

Ironically, “public choice”—not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives.

My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points— empirically—to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role.

Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed mili- tary, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rational- ity in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations.

Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed,

so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged.

My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are).

A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circum- stances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious, “rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operate, compared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

**Gotta Kill Terrorists**

**Terrorists have religious motivations that make discourse and compromise meaningless. The only way to win the war we are in is to kill them before they kill us.¶**

**Peters 4**

- (Ralph, Retired Army Officer, “In Praise of Attrition,” Parameters, Summer)¶

Trust me. **We don’t need discourses.** **We need** plain talk, honest answers, and **the will to close with the enemy and kill him**. And to keep on killing him until it is unmistakably clear to the entire world who won. When military officers start speaking in academic gobbledygook, it means they have nothing to contribute to the effectiveness of our forces. They badly need an assignment to Fallujah. **Consider our enemies in the War on Terror. Men who believe**, literally, **that they are on a mission from God to destroy your civilization and who regard death as a promotion** are not impressed by elegant maneuvers. **You must find them**, no matter how long it takes, **then kill them**. If they surrender, you must accord them their rights under the laws of war and international conventions. But, as we have learned so painfully from all the mindless, left-wing nonsense spouted about the prisoners at Guantanamo, you are much better off killing them before they have a chance to surrender. We have heard no end of blather about network-centric warfare, to the great profit of defense contractors. If you want to see a superb—and cheap—example of “net-war,” look at al Qaeda. The mere possession of technology does not ensure that it will be used effectively. And effectiveness is what matters. It isn’t a question of whether or not we want to fight a war of attrition against religion-fueled terrorists. We’re in a war of attrition with them. We have no realistic choice. Indeed, our enemies are, in some respects, better suited to both global and local wars of maneuver than we are. They have a world in which to hide, and the world is full of targets for them. They do not heed laws or boundaries. They make and observe no treaties. They do not expect the approval of the United Nations Security Council. They do not face election cycles. And their weapons are largely provided by our own societies. We have the technical capabilities to deploy globally, but, for now, we are forced to watch as Pakistani forces fumble efforts to surround and destroy concentrations of terrorists; we cannot enter any country (except, temporarily, Iraq) without the permission of its government. We have many tools—military, diplomatic, economic, cultural, law enforcement, and so on—but we have less freedom of maneuver than our enemies. But we do have superior killing power, once our enemies have been located. Ultimately, the key advantage of a superpower is superpower. Faced with implacable enemies who would kill every man, woman, and child in our country and call the killing good (the ultimate war of attrition), we must be willing to use that power wisely, but remorselessly. We are, militarily and nationally, in a transition phase. **Even after 9/11, we do not fully appreciate the cruelty and determination of our enemies**. **We will learn our lesson, painfully, because the terrorists will not quit. The only solution is to kill them and keep on killing them: a war of attrition. But a war of attrition fought on our terms, not theirs**. **Of course, we shall hear no end of fatuous arguments to the effect that we can’t kill our way out of the problem.** Well, **until a better methodology is discovered, killing every terrorist we can find is a good interim solution.** The truth is that even if you can’t kill yourself out of the problem, **you can make the problem a great deal smaller by effective targeting.**

**And we shall hear that killing terrorists only creates more terrorists. This is sophomoric nonsense**. **The surest way to swell the ranks of terror is to follow the approach we did in the decade before 9/11 and do nothing of substance**. **Success breeds success. Everybody loves a winner**. The clichés exist because they’re true. Al Qaeda and related terrorist groups metastasized because they were viewed in the Muslim world as standing up to the West successfully and handing the Great Satan America embarrassing defeats with impunity. **Some fanatics will flock to the standard of terror, no matter what we do. But it’s far easier for Islamic societies to purge themselves of terrorists if the terrorists are on the losing end of the global struggle than if they’re allowed to become triumphant heroes to every jobless, unstable teenager in the Middle East and beyond**. **Far worse than fighting such a war of attrition aggressively is to pretend you’re not in one while your enemy keeps on killing you.** Even the occupation of Iraq is a war of attrition. We’re doing remarkably well, given the restrictions under which our forces operate. **But no grand maneuvers, no gestures of humanity, no offers of conciliation, and no compromises will persuade the terrorists to halt their efforts to disrupt the development of a democratic, rule-of-law** Iraq. On the contrary, **anything less than relentless pursuit, with both preemptive and retaliatory action, only encourages the terrorists and remaining Baathist gangsters.**

### Impacts

#### Life should be valued as apriori – it precedes the ability to value anything else

Amien Kacou. 2008. WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

Furthermore, that manner of finding things good that is in pleasure can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,” as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself. And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good. However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value. But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

### Rejection Fails

#### The alternative results in more securitization and intervention

Tara **McCormack, 2010**, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 127-129)

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework there were at least formal and clear demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful states, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

### Scenario Building Good

#### Prefer specific scenarios – even if we invoke some security logic, the fact that others will securitize means that we have to make worst-case assessments to avoid escalation

Ole Waever, Senior Research Fellow – Copenhagen Peace Research Inst., 2K

(I. R. Theory & the Politics of European Integration, ed Kelstrup/Williams p. 282-285)

The other main possibility is to stress responsibility. Particularly in a field like security one has to make choices and deal with the challenges and risks that one confronts – and not shy away into long-range or principled transformations. The meta-political line risks (despite the theoretical commitment to the concrete other) implying that politics can be contained within large ‘systemic’ questions. In line with the classical revolutionary tradition, after the change (now no longer the revolution but the meta-physical transformation), there will be no more problems whereas in our situation (until the change) we should not deal with the ‘small questions’ of politics, only with the large one (cf. Rorty 1996). However, the ethical demand in post-structuralism (e.g. Derrida’s ‘justice’) is of a kind that can never be instantiated in any concrete political order – it is an experience of the undecidable that exceeds any concrete solution and re-inserts politics. Therefore, politics can never be reduced to meta-questions; there is no way to erase the small, particular, banal conflicts and controversies. In contrast to the quasi-institutionalist formula of radical democracy which one finds in the ‘opening’ oriented version of deconstruction, we could with Derrida stress the singularity of the event. To take a position, take part, and ‘produce events’ (Derrida 1994: 89) means to get involved in specific struggles. Politics takes place ‘in the singular event of engagement’ (Derrida 1996: 83). Derrida’s politics is focused on the calls that demand response/responsibility in words like justice, Europe and emancipation. Should we treat security in this manner? No, security is not that kind of call. ‘Security’ is not a way to open (or keep open) an ethical horizon. Security is a much more situational concept oriented to the handling of specifics. It belongs to the sphere of how to handle challenges – and avoid ‘the worst’ (Derrida 1991). Here enters again the possible pessimism hich for the security analyst might be occupational or structural. The infinitude of responsibility (Derrida 1996: 86) or the tragic nature of politics (Morgenthau 1946, Chapter 7) means that one can never feel reassured that by some ‘good deed’, ‘I have assumed my responsibilities’ (Derrida 1996: 86). If I conduct myself particularly well with regard to someone, I know that it is to the detriment of an other; of one nation to the detriment of another nation, of one family to the detriment of another family, of my friends to the detriment of other friends or non-friends, etc. This is the infinitude that inscribes itself within responsibility; otherwise there would be no ethical problems or decisions. (ibid.; and parallel argumentation in Morgenthau 1946; Chapters 6 and 7) Because of this there will remain conflicts and risks – and the question of how to handle them. Should developments be securitized (and if so, in what terms)? Often our reply will be to aim for de-securitization and then politics meet meta-politics; but occasionally the underlying pessimism regarding the prospects for orderliness and compatibility among human aspirations will point to scenarios sufficiently worrisome that responsibility will entail securitization in order to block the worst. As a security/securitization analyst, this means accepting the task of trying to manage and avoid spirals and accelerating security concerns, to try to assist in shaping the continent in a way that creates the least insecurity and violence – even if this occasionally means invoking/producing ‘structures’ or even using the dubious instrument of securitization. In the case of current European configuration, the above analysis suggests the use of securitization at the level of European scenarios with the aim of preempting and avoiding numerous instances of local securitization that could lead to security dilemmas and escalations, violence and mutual vilification.

#### Scenario planning is key to effective energy policy

Laurance R. Geri and David E. McNabb. 2011. teaches in the Masters Program in Public Administration (MPA) at Evergreen State. Energy Policy in the U.S.: Politics, Challenges, and Prospects for Change. p. 30

Energy planners were chastened by the failure to anticipate the oil embargo, and subsequent changes in the demand and supply of important energy sources. Eventually a new approach to energy planning was developed, termed integrated resource planning (IRP) that combined improved forecasting techniques, use of scenarios to clarify possible combinations of anticipated demand, and used a least-cost decision rule for selecting future sources. IRP also emphasizes alternatives to conventional generation, including demand-side management approaches and systematic improvements. The overall IRP approach was mandated for public utilities in the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Whether IRP has improved utility performance is an open question. The more difficult question of whether energy analysts have improved their capacity to forecast future energy needs and events is still under debate. Winebrake and Sakva (2006) concluded that U.S. Department of Energy forecasts had not improved over a twenty-year period. Smil (2008) is likely correct that a better strategy is to formulate scenarios of energy use and their implications for society as a whole. Those may be used as starting points for debate about the type of future we want, and how to enact and implement policies that help us create that future. Box 2.1 is one small contribution to an explanation of why a solution to our widely understood energy problem has yet to be presented, let alone adopted.

**Epistemology focus causes endless paradigm wars.**

**Wendt**,**1998**. professor of international security – Ohio State University, (Alexander, “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,” British International Studies Association)

As a community, we in the academic study of international politics spend too much time worrying about the kind of issues addressed in this essay. The central point of IR scholarship is to increase our knowledge of how the world works, not to worry about how (or whether) we can know how the world works. What matters for IR is ontology, not epistemology. This doesn’t mean that there are no interesting epistemological questions in IR, and even less does it mean that there are no important political or sociological aspects to those questions. Indeed there are, as I have suggested above, and as a discipline IR should have more awareness of these aspects. At the same time, however, these are questions best addressed by philosophers and sociologists of knowledge, not political scientists. Let’s face it: most IR scholars, including this one, have little or no proper training in epistemology, and as such **the attempt to solve epistemological problems anyway will inevitably lead to confusion** (after all, **after 2000 years, even the specialists are still having a hard time**). Moreover, **as long as we let our research be driven in an open-minded fashion by substantive questions and problems rather than by epistemologies and methods, there is little need to answer epistemological questions** either. **It is simply not the case that we have to undertake an epistemological analysis of how we can know something before we can know it, a fact amply attested to by the success of the natural sciences, whose practitioners are only rarely forced by the results of their inquiries to consider epistemological questions. In important respects we do know how international politics works, and it doesn’t much matter how we came to that knowledge**. In that light, **going into the epistemology business will distract us from the real business of IR, which is international politics. Our great debates should be about first-order issues of substance**, like the ‘first debate’ between Realists and Idealists, **not second-order issues of method.** Unfortunately, it is no longer a simple matter for IR scholars to ‘just say no’ to **epistemological discourse**. The problem is that this discourse **has** already **contaminated our thinking about international politics, helping to polarize the discipline into ‘paradigm wars’**. Although the resurgence of these wars in the 1980s and 90s is due in large part to the rise of post-positivism, its roots lie in the epistemological anxiety of positivists, who since the 1950s have been very concerned to establish the authority of their work as Science. This is an important goal, one that I share, but its implementation has been marred by an overly narrow conception of science as being concerned only with causal questions that can be answered using the methods of natural science. The effect has been to marginalize historical and interpretive work that does not fit this mould, and to encourage scholars interested in that kind of work to see themselves as somehow not engaged in science. One has to wonder whether the two sides should be happy with the result. Do positivists really mean to suggest that it is not part of science to ask questions about how things are constituted, questions which if those things happen to be made of ideas might only be answerable by interpretive methods? If so, then they seem to be saying that the double-helix model of DNA, and perhaps much of rational choice theory, is not science. And **do post-positivists really** mean to **suggest that students** of social life **should not ask causal questions or** attempt to **test their claims against empirical evidence? If so, then it is not clear by what criteria their work should be judged, or how it differs from art or revelation**. On both sides, in other words, the result of **the** Third Debate’s **sparring over epistemology is often one-sided, intolerant caricatures of science.**

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### Ravenal

#### Defense knowledge correct- Ravenal 9

defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are).

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### High Impact Outweighs

**Even slight risks of catastrophic impacts outweigh**

**Rescher, 83** (Nicholas, Department of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, Risk: A Philosophical Introduction to the theory of risk evaluation, p. 67)

In such situations we are dealing with hazards that are just not in the same league. Certain hazards are simply unacceptable because they involve a relatively unacceptable threat—things may go wrong so badly that, relative to the alternatives, it’s just not worthwhile to “run the risk,” even in the face of a favorable balance of probabilities. The rational man is not willing to trade off against one another by juggling probabilities such outcomes as the loss of one hair and the loss of his health or his freedom. The imbalance or disparity between risks is just too great to be restored by probablistic readjustments. They are (probablistically) incommersuable: confronted with such “incomparable” hazards, we do not bother to weigh this “balance of probabilities” at all, but simply dismiss one alternative as involving risks that are, in the circumstances, “unacceptable”.

## Water Wars

**Your K doesn’t matter because water war is as real as it gets**

**Dinar 2**

SAIS Review 22.2 (2002) 229-253¶ Water, Security, Conflict, and Cooperation¶ Shlomi Dinar is a Ph.D. candidate at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He is concentrating in environment, negotiation, conflict, and cooperation. This paper is dedicated to the memory of Captain Jerome E. Levy. This paper benefited from the Anna Sobol Levy Fellowship, a fellowship supported by Captain Levy. The author would also like to thank Benjamin Miller, Emanuel Adler, and the editors of this journal for very constructive comments. This article was originally inspired from an essay that originally appeared in International Negotiation. Shlomi Dinar, "Negotiation and International Relations: A Framework for Hydropolitics," International Negotiation 5, no. 2 (2000).

**The dichotomy of conflict and cooperation** over water and its relationship to national and regional security **reflects the reality of hydropolitics**. While military clashes have been associated with water, the concept of security does not end with nor does it only imply armed conflict. Because the pursuit of peace, and thus conflict and cooperation, constitutes the flip side of security, **water is indeed relevant to the concept of security**. It is this phenomenon that traditionalists have cast off as irrelevant and other rejectionists of the environment-security link have ignored.¶ **Linking security with the environment does not increase the possibility that nations will engage in more armed action against other states** for the sake of natural resources such as water. Albeit minimal, **evidence already exists as to the military skirmishes** and military threats that have taken place **over water. Nations will engage in armed conflict** and political disputes **over water whether or not scholars acknowledge the link between the environment and security**. Similarly, the existence of more than 3,600 water treaties, the oldest dating to 805 AD, demonstrates a rich history of cooperation [End Page 239] over water regardless of scholarly debate on cooperation and the environment. **The debate** regarding the link between water, conflict, and cooperation **is thus futile and has become a scholarly debate marred by polemics and semantics.**¶ **Given its geographical attributes, freshwater truly straddles the notion of sovereignty that traditionalists cherish so deeply and the international or regional conception that environmental globalists hold true. The problems that arise from shared water resources are both national and regional in nature. Similarly, the solutions that are needed to solve such problems are both national and regional. Most importantly for the debate on the environment and security, however, the impediments to cooperation and the instigation of conflict over water are both national and international in their sources. States in particular regions will continue to see water as a national security concern. Even though a regional agreement may be the best solution to states' water problems, they will continue to couch their need to access sufficient and clean freshwater in security and nationalist terms.**

**Perm solves – we can critique security but still assess the water war impacts**

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**Can some sort of compromise be sought in this** ongoing **debate**? One issue often neglected in the traditional school of security studies is that, in addition to the study of war as a part of security, one must also consider the study of peace**. While traditionalists** and other critics have **mounted a compelling attack on** the expansion of the concept of **security,** **the relevance of hydropolitics to conflict and cooperation and thus peace studies is clear**. **Therefore, the door should be open to a great variety of causal factors,** theories, **and explanations** **under the condition that they logically and empirically affect war, peace, and** nonmilitary causes or means affecting national as well as regional and international **security.** 28 **The water-security link is therefore valid so long as hydropolitics logically and empirically affects conflict and cooperation**, which in turn affects national, regional, and international security. Therefore, **water scarcity and hydropolitics should be considered part of the security field** to the extent that freshwater issues affect the likelihood of violence, war, or peace. 29

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### Nuclear Images Good

**Images of nuclear apocalypse are necessary to problematize their usage**

James **Foard. 1997**. Associate Professor of Religion, Arizona State, “Imagining Nuclear Weapons: Hiroshima, Armageddon, and the Annihilation of the Students of Ichijo School,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, http://jaar.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/LXV/1/1.pdf TBC 7/1/10)

**This ambivalence about Hiroshima has been partially ameliorated by displacing it with Armageddon in our imagination of nuclear weapons** In America **the images of the atomic bomb**, particularly after the Soviet Union's successful test in 1949 (Boyer.341), **were pressed into the service of apocalyptic speculations**, both scientific and otherwise, a process which has until recently assigned the horror that Hiroshima represented to a superpower war in an imagined future (cf. Pease'562). Specifically, **images of a nuclear Armageddon have helped us perform two sorts of cultural tasks fundamental for imagining nuclear weapons**: those involving difference and those involving representation. By "difference" I mean both **the articulation of what makes nuclear weapons different from other weapons and the consequent reflection on the different human situation engendered by them**. By "representation" I mean **the expressions which seek to describe the use of nuclear weapons and incorporate that description into structures of meaning Armageddon permits us to define the difference of nuclear weapons by their capacity to destroy the human species** in a war that no one will win. It also has suggested to many, particularly literary critics but also some nuclear strategists, that nuclear war is but an imaginary event, divorced from reality, such that all representations are, to use the most famous phrase, "fabulously textual" (Derrida'23).

## Pursuit Inevitable

#### Pursuit of hegemony’s locked-in

Zach Dorfman 12, assistant editor of Ethics and International Affairs, the journal of the Carnegie Council, and co-editor of the Montreal Review, “What We Talk About When We Talk About Isolationism”, May 18, <http://dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=605>

The rise of China notwithstanding, the United States remains the world’s sole superpower. Its military (and, to a considerable extent, political) hegemony extends not just over North America or even the Western hemisphere, but also Europe, large swaths of Asia, and Africa. Its interests are global; nothing is outside its potential sphere of influence. There are an estimated 660 to 900 American military bases in roughly forty countries worldwide, although figures on the matter are notoriously difficult to ascertain, largely because of subterfuge on the part of the military. According to official data there are active-duty U.S. military personnel in 148 countries, or over 75 percent of the world’s states. The United States checks Russian power in Europe and Chinese power in South Korea and Japan and Iranian power in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey. In order to maintain a frigid peace between Israel and Egypt, the American government hands the former $2.7 billion in military aid every year, and the latter $1.3 billion. It also gives Pakistan more than $400 million dollars in military aid annually (not including counterinsurgency operations, which would drive the total far higher), Jordan roughly $200 million, and Colombia over $55 million.

U.S. long-term military commitments are also manifold. It is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the only institution legally permitted to sanction the use of force to combat “threats to international peace and security.” In 1949 the United States helped found NATO, the first peacetime military alliance extending beyond North and South America in U.S. history, which now has twenty-eight member states. The United States also has a trilateral defense treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and bilateral mutual defense treaties with Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea. It is this sort of reach that led Madeleine Albright to call the United States the sole “indispensible power” on the world stage.

The idea that global military dominance and political hegemony is in the U.S. national interest—and the world’s interest—is generally taken for granted domestically. Opposition to it is limited to the libertarian Right and anti-imperialist Left, both groups on the margins of mainstream political discourse. Today, American supremacy is assumed rather than argued for: in an age of tremendous political division, it is a bipartisan first principle of foreign policy, a presupposition. In this area at least, one wishes for a little less agreement.

In Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age, Christopher McKnight Nichols provides an erudite account of a period before such a consensus existed, when ideas about America’s role on the world stage were fundamentally contested. As this year’s presidential election approaches, each side will portray the difference between the candidates’ positions on foreign policy as immense. Revisiting Promise and Peril shows us just how narrow the American worldview has become, and how our public discourse has become narrower still.

Nichols focuses on the years between 1890 and 1940, during America’s initial ascent as a global power. He gives special attention to the formative debates surrounding the Spanish-American War, U.S. entry into the First World War, and potential U.S. membership in the League of Nations—debates that were constitutive of larger battles over the nature of American society and its fragile political institutions and freedoms. During this period, foreign and domestic policy were often linked as part of a cohesive political vision for the country. Nichols illustrates this through intellectual profiles of some of the period’s most influential figures, including senators Henry Cabot Lodge and William Borah, socialist leader Eugene Debs, philosopher and psychologist William James, journalist Randolph Bourne, and the peace activist Emily Balch. Each of them interpreted isolationism and internationalism in distinct ways, sometimes deploying the concepts more for rhetorical purposes than as cornerstones of a particular worldview.

Today, isolationism is often portrayed as intellectually bankrupt, a redoubt for idealists, nationalists, xenophobes, and fools. Yet the term now used as a political epithet has deep roots in American political culture. Isolationist principles can be traced back to George Washington’s farewell address, during which he urged his countrymen to steer clear of “foreign entanglements” while actively seeking nonbinding commercial ties. (Whether economic commitments do in fact entail political commitments is another matter.) Thomas Jefferson echoed this sentiment when he urged for “commerce with all nations, [and] alliance with none.” Even the Monroe Doctrine, in which the United States declared itself the regional hegemon and demanded noninterference from European states in the Western hemisphere, was often viewed as a means of isolating the United States from Europe and its messy alliance system.

In Nichols’s telling, however, modern isolationism was born from the debates surrounding the Spanish-American War and the U.S. annexation of the Philippines. Here isolationism began to take on a much more explicitly anti-imperialist bent. Progressive isolationists such as William James found U.S. policy in the Philippines—which it had “liberated” from Spanish rule just to fight a bloody counterinsurgency against Philippine nationalists—anathema to American democratic traditions and ideas about national self-determination.

As Promise and Peril shows, however, “cosmopolitan isolationists” like James never called for “cultural, economic, or complete political separation from the rest of the world.” Rather, they wanted the United States to engage with other nations peacefully and without pretensions of domination. They saw the United States as a potential force for good in the world, but they also placed great value on neutrality and non-entanglement, and wanted America to focus on creating a more just domestic order. James’s anti-imperialism was directly related to his fear of the effects of “bigness.” He argued forcefully against all concentrations of power, especially those between business, political, and military interests. He knew that such vested interests would grow larger and more difficult to control if America became an overseas empire.

Others, such as “isolationist imperialist” Henry Cabot Lodge, the powerful senator from Massachusetts, argued that fighting the Spanish-American War and annexing the Philippines were isolationist actions to their core. First, banishing the Spanish from the Caribbean comported with the Monroe Doctrine; second, adding colonies such as the Philippines would lead to greater economic growth without exposing the United States to the vicissitudes of outside trade. Prior to the Spanish-American War, many feared that the American economy’s rapid growth would lead to a surplus of domestic goods and cause an economic disaster. New markets needed to be opened, and the best way to do so was to dominate a given market—that is, a country—politically. Lodge’s defense of this “large policy” was public and, by today’s standards, quite bald. Other proponents of this policy included Teddy Roosevelt (who also believed that war was good for the national character) and a significant portion of the business class. For Lodge and Roosevelt, “isolationism” meant what is commonly referred to today as “unilateralism”: the ability for the United States to do what it wants, when it wants.

Other “isolationists” espoused principles that we would today call internationalist. Randolph Bourne, a precocious journalist working for the New Republic, passionately opposed American entry into the First World War, much to the detriment of his writing career. He argued that hypernationalism would cause lasting damage to the American social fabric. He was especially repulsed by wartime campaigns to Americanize immigrants. Bourne instead envisioned a “transnational America”: a place that, because of its distinct cultural and political traditions and ethnic diversity, could become an example to the rest of the world. Its respect for plurality at home could influence other countries by example, but also by allowing it to mediate international disputes without becoming a party to them. Bourne wanted an America fully engaged with the world, but not embroiled in military conflicts or alliances.

This was also the case for William Borah, the progressive Republican senator from Idaho. Borah was an agrarian populist and something of a Jeffersonian: he believed axiomatically in local democracy and rejected many forms of federal encroachment. He was opposed to extensive immigration, but not “anti-immigrant.” Borah thought that America was strengthened by its complex ethnic makeup and that an imbalance tilted toward one group or another would have deleterious effects. But it is his famously isolationist foreign policy views for which Borah is best known. As Nichols writes:

He was consistent in an anti-imperialist stance against U.S. domination abroad; yet he was ambivalent in cases involving what he saw as involving obvious national interest….He also without fail argued that any open-ended military alliances were to be avoided at all costs, while arguing that to minimize war abroad as well as conflict at home should always be a top priority for American politicians.

Borah thus cautiously supported entry into the First World War on national interest grounds, but also led a group of senators known as “the irreconcilables” in their successful effort to prevent U.S. entry into the League of Nations. His paramount concern was the collective security agreement in the organization’s charter: he would not assent to a treaty that stipulated that the United States would be obligated to intervene in wars between distant powers where the country had no serious interest at stake.

Borah possessed an alternative vision for a more just and pacific international order. Less than a decade after he helped scuttle American accession to the League, he helped pass the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) in a nearly unanimous Senate vote. More than sixty states eventually became party to the pact, which outlawed war between its signatories and required them to settle their disputes through peaceful means. Today, realists sneer at the idealism of Kellogg-Briand, but the Senate was aware of the pact’s limitations and carved out clear exceptions for cases of national defense. Some supporters believed that, if nothing else, the law would help strengthen an emerging international norm against war. (Given what followed, this seems like a sad exercise in wish-fulfillment.) Unlike the League of Nations charter, the treaty faced almost no opposition from the isolationist bloc in the Senate, since it did not require the United States to enter into a collective security agreement or abrogate its sovereignty. This was a kind of internationalism Borah and his irreconcilables could proudly support.

The United States today looks very different from the country in which Borah, let alone William James, lived, both domestically (where political and civil freedoms have been extended to women, African Americans, and gays and lesbians) and internationally (with its leading role in many global institutions). But different strains of isolationism persist. Newt Gingrich has argued for a policy of total “energy independence” (in other words, domestic drilling) while fulminating against President Obama for “bowing” to the Saudi king. While recently driving through an agricultural region of rural Colorado, I saw a giant roadside billboard calling for American withdrawal from the UN.

Yet in the last decade, the Republican Party, with the partial exception of its Ron Paul/libertarian faction, has veered into such a belligerent unilateralism that its graybeards—one of whom, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, just lost a primary to a far-right challenger partly because of his reasonableness on foreign affairs—were barely able to ensure Senate ratification of a key nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia. Many of these same people desire a unilateral war with Iran.

And it isn’t just Republicans. Drone attacks have intensified in Yemen, Pakistan, and elsewhere under the Obama administration. Massive troop deployments continue unabated. We spend over $600 billion dollars a year on our military budget; the next largest is China’s, at “only” around $100 billion. Administrations come and go, but the national security state appears here to stay.

#### Hegemonic strategy inevitable

Calleo, Director – European Studies Program and Professor @ SAIS, ‘10

(David P, “American Decline Revisited,” *Survival*, 52:4, 215 – 227)

The history of the past two decades suggests that adjusting to a plural world is not easy for the United States. As its economic strength is increasingly challenged by relative decline, it clings all the more to its peerless military prowess. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, that overwhelming military power, evolved over the Cold War, is less and less effective. In many respects, America's geopolitical imagination seems frozen in the posture of the Cold War. The lingering pretension to be the dominant power everywhere has encouraged the United States to hazard two unpromising land wars, plus a diffuse and interminable struggle against 'terrorism'. Paying for these wars and the pretensions behind them confirms the United States in a new version of Cold War finance. Once more, unmanageable fiscal problems poison the currency, an old pathology that firmly reinstates the nation on its path to decline. It was the hegemonic Cold War role, after all, that put the United States so out of balance with the rest of the world economy. In its hegemonic Cold War position, the United States found it necessary to run very large deficits and was able to finance them simply by creating and exporting more and more dollars. The consequence is today's restless mass of accumulated global money. Hence, whereas the value of all global financial assets in 1980 was just over 100% of global output, by 2008, even after the worst of the financial implosion, that figure had exploded to just under 300%.25 Much of this is no doubt tied up in the massive but relatively inert holdings of the Chinese and Japanese. But thanks to today's instantaneous electronic transfers, huge sums can be marshalled and deployed on very short notice. It is this excess of volatile money that arguably fuels the world's great recurring bubbles. It can create the semblance of vast real wealth for a time, but can also (with little notice) sow chaos in markets, wipe out savings and dry up credit for real investment. What constitutes a morbid overstretch in the American political economy thus ends up as a threat to the world economy in general. To lead itself and the world into a more secure future the United States must put aside its old, unmeasured geopolitical ambitions paid for by unlimited cheap credit. Instead, the United States needs a more balanced view of its role in history. But America's post-Soviet pundits have, unfortunately, proved more skilful at perpetuating outmoded dreams of past glory than at promoting the more modest visions appropriate to a plural future. One can always hope that newer generations of Americans will find it easier to adjust to pluralist reality. The last administration, however, was not very encouraging in this regard. III What about Barack Obama? So far, his economic policy has shown itself probably more intelligent and certainly more articulate than his predecessor's. His thinking is less hobbled by simple-minded doctrines. It accepts government's inescapable role in regulating markets and providing a durable framework for orderly governance and societal fellowship. To be sure, the Obama administration, following in the path of the Bush administration, has carried short-term counter-cyclical stimulation to a previously unimagined level. Perhaps so radical an expansion of credit is unavoidable under present circumstances. The administration is caught between the need to rebalance by scaling back and the fear that restraint applied now will trigger a severe depression. Obama's chief aide, Rahm Emanuel, is famous for observing: 'Rule one: Never allow a crisis to go to waste. They are opportunities to do big things.'26 So far, Obama's administration has made use of its crisis to promote an unprecedented expansion of welfare spending.27 Much of the spending is doubtless good in itself and certainly serves the administration's strong counter-cyclical purposes. But at some point the need to pass from expansion to stabilisation will presumably be inescapable. Budget cuts will have to be found somewhere, and demographic trends suggest that drastic reductions in civilian welfare spending are unlikely. Elementary prudence might suggest that today's financial crisis is an ideal occasion for America's long-overdue retreat from geopolitical overstretch, a time for bringing America's geopolitical pretensions into harmony with its diminishing foreign possibilities and expanding domestic needs. The opportunities for geopolitical saving appear significant. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), current military plans will require an average military budget of $652bn (in 2010 dollars) each year through 2028. The estimate optimistically assumes only 30,000 troops will be engaged abroad after 2013. As the CBO observes, these projections exceed the peak budgets of the Reagan administration's military build-up of the mid-1980s (about $500bn annually in 2010 dollars). This presumes a military budget consuming 3.5% of GDP through 2020.28 Comparable figures for other nations are troubling: 2.28% for the United Kingdom, 2.35% for France, 2.41% for Russia and 1.36% for China.29 Thus, while the financial crisis has certainly made Americans fear for their economic future, it does not yet seem to have resulted in a more modest view of the country's place in the world, or a more prudent approach to military spending. Instead, an addiction to hegemonic status continues to blight the prospects for sound fiscal policy. Financing the inevitable deficits inexorably turns the dollar into an imperial instrument that threatens the world with inflation.

## Mcormick

#### The alternative results in more securitization and intervention

Tara **McCormack, 2010**, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 127-129)

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework there were at least formal and clear demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful states, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

### High Prob O/W

**Large enough impacts make probability drop out of consideration**

**Rescher, 83** (Nicholas, Department of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, Risk: A Philosophical Introduction to the theory of risk evaluation, p. 68)

With “ordinary” risk situations, one is in a position to use expected values as a basis for assessment. But there are various sorts of “incommensurable” risks for which this procedure is not reasonable. When the discrepancy of the negatives at issue in a risk situation is sufficiently large, some hazards are simply *unacceptable* relative to the others, and it makes perfectly good sense to ignore the “balance of probabilities” and proceed simply and **solely** with reference to this disparity. In such cases one will prefer—perfectly reasonably—the certainty of a small loss to the remote prospect of a large loss, even when the hazard associated with this choice has the lesser expected value. (The only qualification here is that the disasterous outcome in view must represent a real possibility and not one whise probability is effectively zero.)